European University Institute Department of Economics

This version: July 3rd, 2023

Outline of Microeconomics Sequence (2023-2024)

Compulsory Courses (Year 1, compulsory)

Microeconomics I: Rational Choice, Markets and Prices (Laurent Mathevet, laurent.mathevet@eui.eu)

Microeconomics II: Game Theory

(Özlem Bedre-Defolie, Ozlem.Bedre@esmt.org)

Microeconomics III: Economics of Information, Social Choice Theory and Mechanism Design (Andrea Mattozzi, andrea.mattozzi@eui.eu)

Advanced Courses (Year 2+, elective)

Advanced 1: Mechanism and Information Design, Part I [full credit]

(Laurent Mathevet, laurent.mathevet@eui.eu and Zeinab Aboutalebi, Zeinab.Aboutalebi@eui.eu)

Advanced 2: Advanced Industrial Organization [full credit] (Giacomo Calzolari, giacomo.calzolari@eui.eu)

Advanced 3: Information Design in Political Economy [half credit] (Parth Parihar, Parth.Parihar@eui.eu)

Advanced 4: Organizational Economics [full credit] (Zeinab Aboutalebi, Zeinab.Aboutalebi@eui.eu)

Advanced 5: Mechanism and Information Design, Part II (Workshop) [half credit] (Laurent Mathevet, laurent.mathevet@eui.eu and Zeinab Aboutalebi, Zeinab.Aboutalebi@eui.eu)

Timing

	Block I	Block II	Block III	Block IV
Compulsory Courses	1	2	3	
Advanced Courses	1	2-3	4	5

Contents of Compulsory Courses

Microeconomics I: Rational Choice, Markets and Prices (Laurent Mathevet)

This course builds the foundations of microeconomic analysis, starting from preferences and standard consumer choice and ending with competitive markets.

Topics covered:

- Preferences and Utility
- Consumer Choice
- Producer Theory
- Aggregation
- Choice under Uncertainty
- Competitive Equilibrium

Teaching material:

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. H. Varian (1984), Microeconomic Analysis, Norton, 2nd edition G.A. Jehle and P.J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall 2011. A. Rubinstein (2012), Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory, Princeton University Press, 2nd edition

Microeconomics II: Game Theory (Özlem Bedre-Defolie)

This course builds the foundations of game theory starting from static games and ending with Bayesian Games.

Topics covered:

- Static Games
- Auctions and Political Economy
- Dynamic Games
- Repeated Games
- Uncertainty
- Bayesian Games
- Mechanism Design
- Dynamic Moral Hazard

Teaching material:

Osborn and Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory Fudenberg and Tirole, Game Theory

Microeconomics III: Economics of Information, Social Choice Theory and Mechanism Design (Andrea Mattozzi)

This course will cover models of asymmetric information in markets (signaling, competitive and monopolistic screening), principal-agent models, mechanism design, social choice.

Topics covered:

- Adverse Selection
- Signaling in Insurance and Labor Markets
- Competitive Screening
- Moral Hazard
- Auctions
- Social Choice
- Implementation and Mechanism Design

Teaching material:

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press. G.A. Jehle and P.J. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory, 3rd edition, Prentice Hall 2011. Salanie B., The Economics of Contracts, MIT

Contents of Advanced Courses

See the syllabi.