

# CONCEPTUALIZING AND MEASURING THE LIBERALIZATION OF AUTOCRACY AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY ACROSS REGIONS OF THE WORLD AND FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF DEPARTURE

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When the present wave of democratization began in 1974 not only did no one imagine how much of the surface of the political world would be affected by it, but also no one even considered the possibility of measuring its depth and analyzing the force of its surge quantitatively. Each of the initial instances in Southern Europe and Latin America looked quite peculiar in socio-economic context and mode of transition. Moreover, the limited number of cases seemed to make it unproductive to try to bring the power of probabilistic statistics to bear. “Common Conceptualization + Qualitative Description + Tentative Identification of ‘Possibilistic’ Devices and Outcomes” seemed the only formula one could apply.

Now, after almost thirty years of political experience and innumerable academic controversies, we have the potential raw material for measuring in a reliable, comparable and quantitative way the changes over time that have occurred at the macro-level of national political regimes for a sufficiently large number of cases. And by developing indicators (and, especially as we shall see, scales of indicators) to measure the processes of **liberalization of autocracy** and the **consolidation of democracy**, we may also be able to resolve some (but never all) of the disputes that have arisen concerning whether it is correct to use the same concepts and assumptions across polities in a wide range of cultural, political and economic settings. Presumably, if regime change in each of these “world regions” or from each of these different “points of departure” really does require a unique form of understanding/analysis – then, the standard items that we measure across all cases should not produce significant patterns of association and, least of all, consistent scalar relations over time.

In this article, we report “work-in-progress” that began – thanks to a grant from the Volkswagen Stiftung – with a comparative analysis of the Liberalization of Autocracy (LoA) and the Consolidation of Democracy (CoD) in a limited number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Subsequently, its measurement *instrumentarium* has been extended to cover earlier cases of regime change in Southern Europe, South America, Central Europe and the Republics of the former Soviet Union.

## Conceptualizing the Two Dependent Variables

None of the two processes mentioned above has been consistently conceptualized, much less operationalized in the literature on democratization. They may have been used quite often, but almost invariably in an erratic fashion – even by the same author in the same work. Moreover, the empirical indicator that has been most frequently employed in quantitative analyses, the Freedom House Index, is seriously deficient and distorted, especially when used to measure the variation across regions or over

time in the same country.<sup>1</sup> What makes our task especially challenging is the need to operationalize these “processes of regime change” in such a way that the measurements are apposite, accurate and comparable for countries in different regions of the world. And we need to do so in a manner that is sensitive to rather discrete changes over time and, hence, that can capture the dynamics and sequences of liberalization, transition and consolidation.<sup>2</sup>

### ***Liberalization of Autocracy***

Liberalization is a commonly used and well accepted term in both political and scholarly discourse. However, since it seems to most persons to be a desirable state of affairs, it has been appropriated for a wide range of purposes – not all of which are appropriate from the perspective of this research. Strictly speaking, we should be exclusively concerned with **political** liberalization. Elsewhere, this has been defined as: “the process of making effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties.”<sup>3</sup> Needless to say, there can be a considerable range of dispute over what these civic/political rights should be, but there does exist a widespread consensus on some of them. At the level of individuals, these guarantees include the classic elements of the liberal tradition: habeas corpus, sanctity of private home and correspondence, protection against torture and inhuman treatment by authorities, the right to be defended in a fair trial according to pre-established laws, freedom of movement, speech, petition, religious conviction and so forth. For social or political groups, these rights have historically covered such things as freedom from punishment for collective expressions of dissent from government policy, freedom from censorship of the means of communication and freedom to associate voluntarily and peacefully with other persons.

*Nota bene* what has **not** been included in this conceptualization of liberalization. No doubt that in the course of political struggle in well-entrenched democracies the content and coverage of rights have expanded over time and, at least in the case of Europe and North America, have tended to converge toward a shared set of norms. Nevertheless, items such a “freedom of access to public documents,” “freedom of sexual expression,” “right to free legal counsel,” “right to bear arms,” “freedom from capital punishment,” “right to vote for legally resident foreign nationals,” “*le droit à la différence* extended to foreign language instruction, chador wearing or female circumcision,” or even “rights protecting minority cultures from assimilation” are still quite unequally distributed and respected across these countries and they are even less likely to find widespread acceptance in “non-Western” cultures.

More controversially given the ideology that currently surrounds the topic of democratization, no mention has been made of an unconditional “right to private property” or any of the other

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<sup>1</sup> References to the Freedom House Index and other analogous democratization indicators that observe a high correlation among such indicators do not constitute proof that they are therefore accurate. Rather, this co-variation may reflect generic problems that they share when it comes to measuring such complex and controversial properties. “The most common claim for the validity of democratic performance measures is based on high statistical correlations with other such measures. (...) Yet highly correlated measures may all contain the same errors, all ‘share similar biases’, or all be determined by outside influences that may render their close association spurious. The correlations cannot therefore guarantee that the different measures are all quantifying the same underlying value or concept (...) and hence cannot prove their validity” (Foweraker/Krzmaric 2000 769).

For example, Dean E. Mc Henry Jr. examines Freedom House data-sets for five African countries over time and concludes “neither the reasonableness of the measures’ construction, nor the high degree of inter-correlation among the measures constitutes an empirical test, that is, based upon observations of events indicative of democracy in individual countries.” Thus, “the work of area scholars is important to quantitative specialists not only to facilitate an interpretation of quantitative data, but also to reconstruct the foundation for quantitative work.” (McHenry 2000, p. 171 and 183).

<sup>2</sup> Our approach to measurement is also radically different from that of Adam Przeworski and his associates who insist on dichotomizing the data on political regimes into “democracies” and “non-democracies.” Seen from the perspective of regime change as a complex process, this simplification is inappropriate – not to say, absurd. Regimes do not simply shift in their basic nature from one type to another and many many regimes get stuck somewhere in the middle as hybrids or stalemated outcomes. Our measurement device is precisely designed to capture in depth these indeterminate trajectories – and then to analyze the forces that can probabilistically account for such a diversity of outcomes. Cite.

<sup>3</sup> GO’D and PCS

“freedoms” currently being advocated by economic liberals: abolition of tariffs and quantitative restrictions on international trade, privatization of state-owned enterprises, dismantling of regulatory regimes on financial transactions, production systems and consumer protection, removal of price controls or currency restrictions, lowering of tax burdens, decentralization of collective bargaining or its replacement with individual labor contracts, abolition of state subsidies to producers, sale of public housing to private occupants *e così via!* One of the major assumptions of neo-liberals is that these aspects of economic liberalization are causally linked to political liberalization and eventual democratization. Leaving aside the obvious historical observation that virtually all of the well-entrenched democracies made extensive use of illiberal economic policies when they were developing their respective capitalist economies and consolidating their respective political democracies, one could leave open for empirical examination whether these different forms of liberalization are so tightly correlated with each other in the contemporary world and, if so, in what temporal sequence.

What is essential for the purpose of this research is for us to grasp conceptually and then measure empirically **political** liberalization *in strictu sensu*. At a minimum, this involves a passive and voluntary connection between individuals and groups who are permitted (but not compelled) by authorities to engage in certain forms of “free” behavior and a reliable and permanent commitment by authorities not to engage in certain forms of “coercive” behavior. The shorthand term for this in much of the literature is “exercising and respecting the rule of law” – even if this may imply a much wider range of connections and commitments, and even if many laws actually on the books are hardly “liberal” in their economic or social content.

What liberalization alone does **not** connote is the right for citizens acting equally and collectively to hold their rulers accountable, up to and including the possibility that these citizens can remove their rulers from power by a pre-established procedure, e.g. by defeating them in elections. That process of inserting accountability to citizens into the political process is what we mean by democracy and its consolidation.

### ***Consolidation of Democracy***

**Consolidation of Democracy (CoD)** is a much less common and more controversial term. At first glance, it even seems oxymoronic. Democracies are not supposed to be fully consolidated -- ever. Unique among regime types, they incorporate the potentiality for continuous change and, eventually, self-transformation. By a process of political mobilization, deliberation among representatives, collective choice by rulers, and ratification by citizens, they can not only peacefully remove governments from power, but they can also decide to alter their basic rules and structures.

This "theoretical" reflection clashes, however, with everyday experience in well-established democracies. Not only do their patterns and norms become *de facto* structured in highly predictable and persistent ways, but considerable effort is expended *de jure* to make it quite difficult to change these structures. Past -- so-called "founding" -- generations write constitutions that attempt to bind subsequent ones to a specific institutional format and set of rights. And they can deliberately make them difficult to amend. They also draft statutes and codes which render certain kinds of political behavior punishable, and that creates specific constituencies and rewards particular clienteles that, in turn, make difficult (or even exclude) the entry of new parties into the electoral arena, confer monopolistic recognition upon certain associations, and so forth. Granted that constitutions can be ignored, policies can be reversed and laws can be changed in response to pressures from the *demos*, one should not exaggerate how easily and frequently this can occur in even the most loosely-structured of democracies. So, uncertainty may well be, as Adam Przeworski has argued,<sup>4</sup> a central and enduring characteristic of this type of regime, but it is a form of relative uncertainty heavily conditioned by

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<sup>4</sup> Adam Przeworski, "Some problems in the study of transition to democracy," in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, Vol. III, (Baltimore: John's Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 57-61.

relative certainties. For citizens to tolerate the possibility that their opponents may occupy or influence particular governing positions in their polity and that these newly empowered authorities may even pursue different, possibly damaging, courses of action requires a great deal of mutual trust -- backed by a great deal of structural reassurance.

The consolidation of democracy can be seen as the process or, better, the processes that make such trust and reassurance more likely. This, in turn, makes regular, uncertain and yet circumscribed competition for office and influence possible and institutionalizes the practice of “contingent consent,” i.e. the willingness of actors to compete according to pre-established rules and, if they lose, to consent to the winners the right to govern – contingent upon the right of the losers to compete fairly and win honestly in the future. In other words, CoD seeks to institutionalize certainty in one subset of political roles and policy arenas, while institutionalizing uncertainty in others. And the challenge for democracy consolidators is to find a set of institutions that embody contingent consent among politicians and are capable of invoking the eventual assent of citizens. All this during the period of especially high uncertainty that is characteristic of transiting from one type of regime to another!

It should be noted that politicians and citizens do not necessarily have to agree upon a set of substantive goals or policies that command widespread consensus, but they do have to agree on a common set of rules. This “democratic bargain,” to use Robert Dahl’s felicitous expression,<sup>5</sup> can vary a good deal from one society to another, depending on objective inequalities and cleavage patterns, as well as subjective factors such as the extent of mutual trust, the prevailing standards of fairness, the willingness to compromise and the legitimacy attached to different decision rules in the past. Once it is struck, the bargain may even be compatible with a great deal of dissensus on specific substantive issues.

The academic model that “transitologists” and “consolidologists” have been using looks as follows. Its first assumption-*cum*-hypothesis is that political liberalization usually precedes the transition to some other form of political domination by a noticeable margin of time, although the leads and lags can be quite variable from one country to another and in some cases the two “stages” may occur virtually simultaneously. Secondly, the process of liberalization tends to be more variable and, hence, less predictable over time than the subsequent process of consolidating democracy because its policies are easier to retract (or to distort in practice) and have less of an enduring impact on organizational capacity. Thirdly, a major reason for this is that political liberalization tends to focus upon (and sometimes limit itself to) the concession of rights and protections to individuals rather than to units of collective action, i.e. civil society, whose subsequent behavior is more difficult to control. Fourthly, liberalization is by no means uniquely and universally associated with (i.e. “causes”) regime transition, much less the eventual consolidation of democracy, but it does alter the likelihood that the latter will occur. Fifthly, once a regime transition has begun and a new government has been formed – whether or not as the result of “free and fair” elections – politicians and representatives are likely to make pacts with each other, experiment with *ad hoc* and even *ad hominem* arrangements, impose changes in policy from above, redefine legal norms, alter practices of repression and, thereby, establish precedents that eventually contribute to making consolidation easier or more difficult. In other words, the processes of liberalization, transition and consolidation tend to overlap in different ways and this makes the whole process of regime change much less predictable than the “over-determined” politics of countries with stable regimes.

Another way of making this point is to stress the variety of modes of transition.<sup>6</sup> The autocratic incumbents involved in liberalization may act unilaterally, in (implicit) collusion or in (explicit) coalition with opponents. They may intend to change the type of regime, i.e. to democratize the polity, or merely to improve the viability of their own autocratic rule, i.e. “to change in order that nothing changes.” Whatever their intentions, their actions frequently produce unintended consequences and trigger “undesirable” effects that can force them to go further than they originally intended. Whatever

<sup>5</sup> *After the Revolution: Authority in a Good Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p .

<sup>6</sup> Article with TK

the process or the intention, these tendencies to lay down changes in the “rules” are never sufficient on their own to ensure that liberalization will lead to democratization. This depends on a variety of intervening variables and one of these may be democracy promotion and protection by external actors.

So, when actors change from one political regime to another, they initially pass through a period of considerable uncertainty during which regression to the *statu quo ante* remains possible and the destination to which their efforts are leading remains unclear. The transition period can vary in length, depending in large measure on the mode of regime change that has been adopted, but eventually it must end. The costs -- psychic as well as material -- are simply too great for actors to endure indefinitely. While there will always be some for whom the exhilaration of participating in a continuous “war of movement” remains an end in itself, most actors look forward to settling into a “war of positions” with known allies, established lines of cleavage and predictable opponents -- or to leaving politics and getting on with their other careers or pursuits.

We are now prepared for a formal definition of what it is that we are committed to empirically describing (and ultimately explaining):

**(1) Regime consolidation consists in transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the uncertain struggles of the transition into institutions, i.e. into relationships that are reliably known, regularly practiced and normatively accepted by those persons or collectivities defined as the participants/citizens/ subjects of such institutions; and**

**(2) The consolidation of a democratic regime, then, consists of transforming the *ad hoc* political relations that have emerged piecemeal and partially into stable institutions in such a way that the ensuing channels of access, patterns of inclusion, resources for action and norms about decision-making conform to one overriding standard:** “That of citizenship. This involves both the **right** to be treated by fellow human beings as equal with respect to the making of collective choices and the **obligation** of those implementing such choices to be equally accountable and accessible to all members of the polity. Inversely, this principle imposes the **obligation** on the ruled to respect the legitimacy of choices made by deliberation among equals (or their representatives), and the **right** for the rulers to act with authority (and, therefore, to apply coercion when necessary) in order to promote the effectiveness of such choices and to protect the regime from threats to its persistence.”<sup>7</sup>

To accomplish this, politicians have to agree upon a set of institutions and citizens have eventually to consent (implicitly or explicitly) to the choices made by their representatives. Much of this takes place in an open and deliberative fashion and manifests itself in formal public acts: the drafting and ratifying of a constitution; the passing of laws by parliament; the issuance of executive decrees and administrative regulations; interminable discussions in party congresses and local meetings. Some of it, however, emerges more incidentally and unself-consciously from on-going “private” arrangements within and between the organizations of civil society and from the often informal interactions between them and various agencies of the state. No one doubts that most of the choosing and virtually all of the consenting has to be done by “natives” – if one leaves aside the (few) historical cases in which the country undergoing the regime change was conquered and occupied by “foreigners.”

One of the points stressed in some of the literature is that modern democracy should be conceptualized, not as “a single regime,” but as a composite of “partial regimes.”<sup>8</sup> As CoD progresses, each of these partial regimes becomes institutionalized in a particular sequence, according to distinctive principles, and around different sites -- all, however, having to do with the representation of social groups and the resolution of their ensuing conflicts. Parties, associations, movements, localities and

<sup>7</sup> O'Donnell & Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions*, pp. 7-8. Also Philippe C. Schmitter, “Democratic theory and neocorporatist Practice,” (Florence: European University Working Paper, No. 74, 1983). Notice that accountability is not a property exclusive to democracies. Autocracies may also be accountable – but not to the citizenry.

<sup>8</sup> OK, I am responsible for this assumption – CITE article

various clientele compete and coalesce around these different sites in efforts to capture office and influence policy and, where this is successful, it will have the effect of channeling conflicts toward the public arena, thereby, diminishing recourse to such private means as settling disputes by violence or simply imposing one's will by authoritarian fiat. Authorities with different functions and at different levels of aggregation interact with these representatives of interests and passions, base their legitimacy upon their accountability to different citizen interests (and passions), and reproduce that special form of legitimate power that stems from exercising an effective monopoly over the use of violence.

Constitutions are efforts to establish a single, overarching set of "meta-rules" that would render these partial regimes coherent, assign specific tasks to each and enforce some hierarchical relation among them. If they could gain access to the drafting of such a document, DPP practitioners presumably could exercise considerable influence over the outcome at relatively little cost. But constitutions are rarely successful in delineating and controlling all of the relations between partial regimes. The process of convoking a constituent assembly, producing an acceptable draft and ratifying it by legislative approval and/or popular referendum, undoubtedly, represents a significant moment in CoD and a prize "target of opportunity" for DPP, but many partial regimes will be left undefined. For it is precisely in the interstices between different types of representatives that constitutional norms are most vague and least prescriptive.<sup>9</sup> Even the most detailed of constitutions (and they are becoming more detailed) is unlikely to tell us much about how parties, associations and movements will interact to influence policies. Or about how capital and labor will bargain over income shares under the new meta-rules. Or about how civilian authorities will exert control over the military.

So, the consolidation of democracy involves coming up with rules that are mutually acceptable to rulers and citizens for a set of "partial regimes," each of which serves to articulate different channels of representation. In the "normal" (but by no means necessary and inevitable) train of events leading from the liberalization of autocracy to the consolidation of democracy, this first involves establishing accountability in the domain of electoral competition between political parties representing territorial constituencies. The convocation of so-called "founding elections" is, for many countries, the critical moment during the transition when liberalization gives way to democratization and in order to hold them, "fair rules" and "honest practices" have to be negotiated or imposed or else key groups will not participate and the ensuing elections will be deprived of the "founding effect." Subsequently, sets of rules will be drafted and ratified for other generic domains of modern political democracy, such as civil-military relations, bargaining between capital and labor, the territorial distribution of government authority, the relations between executive and legislative powers, and so forth.<sup>10</sup> When one thinks about it, given the complexity of contemporary polities with their vastly expanded functional tasks, the number of partial regimes seems virtually unlimited, although some are quite clearly more significant than others are. Moreover, the rules governing access and behavior in them are by no means uniform. Simple majorities may suffice in one, but would be quite unacceptable in another where delicate matters of "proportionality" and "intensity" have to be weighed in order to reach a binding decision. Once the most important of these partial regimes have settled into a set of consensual rules that are "reliably known, regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by ... the politicians and citizens" who participate in them, one can safely conclude that democracy had indeed been consolidated and that the country involved had successfully chosen an appropriate type of democracy.

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<sup>9</sup> For a fascinating argument that it is often the "silences" and "abeyances" of constitutions -- their unwritten components -- that are most significant, see Michael Foley, *The Silence of Constitutions. Gaps, 'Abeyances' and Political Temperament in the Maintenance of Government* (London: Routledge, 1989).

<sup>10</sup> Not all cases of regime change will have to produce *ex novo* the full range of partial regimes for the simple reason that it is just possible that the previous autocracy or an even longer period of political history will have already produced an agreement on rules that is not called into question during the transition. For example, in most of the cases in Central Eastern Europe, civilian control over the military had been institutionalized during by the Communist regime (with the ambiguous exception of Poland) and was not the object of particular attention -- at least, not until NATO membership became an issue. Similarly in Spain, it was believed (until the *golpe* of February 1981) that Franco had successfully cured the military of its propensity to intervene in politics. In the earlier cases in Southern Europe (again, with the exception of Spain) and Latin America, the internal borders and distribution of tasks between different levels of government seemed initially not to be controversial -- until external actors came along with their mantra about decentralization. For some comments on this from a "Tocquevillian" perspective, see Schmitter ...

This way of conceptualizing CoD carries with it several implications:

- (1) It means envisaging consolidation as a complex and unevenly accomplished process rather than as a single and linear accomplishment that has usually been conceived as that of conducting "free and fair" elections and, thereby, stabilizing party competition.
- (2) Which, in turn, requires the analyst to acknowledge that the multiple processes that go into CoD may not occur simultaneously or even in ways that are closely linked to each other – either causally or normatively.
- (3) Which implies that the tempo, rhythm, and sequence with which these partial regimes establish their distinctive rules and practices may be an important determinant of the success of the ultimate outcome.
- (4) Which raises the larger (and unresolved) theoretical issue of whether these partial regimes "cluster" in a limited number of types of democracy and, in turn, whether one or another of these *Gestalt* can be prescribed for countries with specific patterns of social cleavage or economic inequality.
- (5) All of this implies that, while transitologists quite explicitly focus on minimalist-procedural-even electoralist definitions of modern political democracy, consolidologists have to broaden the scope of their definition of the dependent variable to include aspects of ruler/representative/citizen relations that are usually ignored or taken for granted, such as establishing civil control over the military, delineating the relation between national and sub-national governments, and creating a viable system of bargaining between interest intermediaries.
- (6) Which, in turn, implies that consolidologists will have to deal not only with identifying and measuring legal rules and empirical patterns of behavior, but also with evaluating whether these rules/patterns correspond to the normative expectations of (most) citizens.

### ***Sub-Conclusion***

The major implication of the preceding discussion is that **no single set of institutions/rules (and, least of all, no single institution or rule) defines political democracy**. Not even such prominent candidates as majority rule, territorial representation, competitive elections, parliamentary sovereignty, a popularly-elected executive or a "responsible party system" can be taken as its distinctive hallmark. Needless to say, this is a serious debility when it comes to measuring CoD. One cannot just seize on some key "meta-relation," such as the manner of forming executive power, trace its transformation into a valued institution, and assume that all the others, the party system, the decision-rules, etc., will co-vary with it or fall into line once a presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential regime has been established and crossed some critical threshold of mutual acceptance. What must be analyzed is an emerging network of relationships involving multiple processes and sites. It may not be difficult to agree on what Robert Dahl has called "the procedural minimum" without which no democracy could be said to exist (secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational freedom, executive accountability), but underlying these accomplishments and flowing from them are much more subtle and complex relations which define both the substance and form of nascent democratic regimes. It is important that elections be held, that parties compete with varying chances of winning, that voter preferences be secretly recorded and honestly counted, that governments be formed by some pre-established process, that associations be free to form, recruit members and exercise influence, that citizens be allowed to contest the policies of their government and hold leaders responsible for their actions. The longer these structures and rules of the "procedural minimum" exist, the greater is the likelihood they will persist. Politics that have had regular elections of

uncertain outcome for, say, forty years are more likely to continue having them in the future than is a polity which has only had them for, say, ten years -- and so forth down the line. Therefore, it is probably correct, *ceteris paribus*, to assume that Italian democracy is more consolidated than either Portuguese or Spanish democracy.

But the sheer "longevity" of such rules is an inadequate base upon which to build an understanding of CoD. For one thing, it doesn't tell us much about **why** or **how** they have persisted. It just records the fact *ex post*. A more serious accusation is that such an approach tends to privilege one set of democratic institutions (usually, political parties and elections) and reifies (not to say, fetishizes) their presence at the expense of others. It could even lead to adopting a historically or culturally peculiar outcome as the standard against which to measure the progress of contemporary neo-democracies. The obvious danger is to consider popular election of the chief executive and competition between two centrist "catch-all" parties as the norm for institutions, and rotation in exclusive responsibility for government as the hallmark of success -- i.e. to apply the U.S. model to evaluate what is happening in Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. Whatever metric one applies, it must be capacious enough to capture the emergence of a much wider range of possible types of democracy.

## Measuring the Dependent Variables

The dependent variables that we have just defined are obviously each composed of a bundle of theoretically related, but not always empirically co-variant conditions. No single observation is likely to be adequate to measure such complex outcomes, least of all across polities in such diverse social, economic and cultural circumstances. The best that one can hope for is to bring to bear several potential indicators and try to find out what (if any) is their underlying structure. At one extreme, they might prove to be so closely correlated that one of them could simply be used as a proxy for the others. At the other extreme, they might vary so independently from each other that the very notion of liberalization or consolidation would have to be rejected. In between lie a considerable range of possible ways for measuring the outcomes that we would like to predict.

Moreover, the (political) liberalization of autocracy (LoA) and the consolidation of democracy (CoD) do not have the same theoretical status in the literature. As befits a variable that tends to be used in a relatively non-controversial fashion, LoA is not that difficult to measure. It involves selecting a limited, but strategic set of freedoms that would be widely recognized across different cultures and world regions and desired by most of their inhabitants. It also means not including "advanced" freedoms that are available to citizens in only a few well-developed liberal democracies or "colateral" freedoms that might facilitate or render democracy more difficult, such as "freedom to own private property," "freedom to compete for clients," "freedom to exercise a given profession," "freedom from state regulation," etc.

As befits a variable that is quite controversial -- even essentially contested -- CoD is likely to be much more difficult to pin down, especially to measure quantitatively in such a way that each country can be reliably ranked on a common scale according to the extent to which it has succeeded in consolidating democracy. This implies the need to include, at least initially, a much wider range of potential indicators that reflect these theoretical controversies. Of course, it is just possible that empirically the items are related to each other and that the real controversy is not over what "it" is, but over what the appropriate threshold for "it" should be.

The measurement strategy we have chosen leaves us with several potential degrees of freedom. We begin with a list of variables that may or may not form a coherent scale and we try to gather systematic and comparable data on countries in CEE and MENA and, subsequently, on other cases from Southern Europe, Latin America, and the former Soviet Republics that all belong to the third wave of democratization. On each item, we try to arrive at a consensual judgement from at least two



independent coders on whether or not, by that specific year, the polity in question had accomplished that task or acquired that trait.<sup>11</sup> These will then be analyzed in a variety of ways to try to produce three different scales, one for liberalization and one for consolidation plus an “intermediate” one for measuring the characteristics of the mode of transition (MoT). Some of the items are manifestly easier to satisfy than others; some would seem to proceed others temporally; some might even be causally related to others.<sup>12</sup>

### ***Trying to Scale the Liberalization of Autocracy***

Figure 1 lists the seven items that were chosen to constitute the LoA scale. With the data on the CEE and MENA countries (and, later on, others), it should be possible to test the following hypotheses:

- (1) That the items chosen capture significant but different aspects of liberal political rights that are not exclusive to “Western” culture; therefore, they should be relevant and provide equivalent indicators in a wide diversity of cultural settings.
- (2) That these items are correlated in some consistent (if probabilistic) fashion across these cases and, therefore, constitute a scale with which it should be possible to make ordinal and even cardinal measurements of the extent of progress toward (political) liberalization.
- (3) That when all seven of the items/tasks have been accomplished, the polity being measured will have effectively completed its process of liberalization.<sup>13</sup>
- (4) That when all the criteria have been satisfied, it will also be much more likely that liberalization will persist in the future, since the different items will have become causally related to each other, making it increasingly difficult for rulers to restrict the application of any one of them.
- (5) Finally, and most controversially, once full liberalization has been attained, there is a high probability that the polity concerned will enter into a transition to democracy.<sup>14</sup> *Grosso modo*, the higher the score on LoA, the higher should be the scores on both MoT and CoD.

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<sup>11</sup> Actually, the techniques of analysis that we will apply permit us to engage in “fuzzy” measurement by assigning less than dichotomous judgements, although we did encourage the coder-experts to try to come up with a yes/no answer.

<sup>12</sup> A methodological device for measuring such a property is the Guttman scale. The logic of such an indicator is determined by the frequency with which a given sample or population of cases attains specific dichotomous attributes. In other words, the issue is whether country “X” has or has not managed to produce “A.” If that is the feat that receives the highest frequency of “yes” votes, it forms the threshold. The implication is that unless a country has done “A,” it has not yet begun to liberalize its autocracy or to consolidate its democracy. Having the least frequently acquired trait, let us call it “Z,” would indicate that liberalization or consolidation has been effectively accomplished in that country – unless one chooses to move the goalposts and add additional feats that have proven even more difficult to acquire. NB that, even if one finds empirically such a cumulative structure in the dichotomized data, this is not by itself proof that the revealed hierarchy of traits was acquired in that temporal order, i.e. that the more frequent ones were necessary and prior conditions for the rarer ones. It should also be noted that the Guttman scales are strictly deterministic and, hence, unlikely to be met perfectly when researching such complex processes as LoA and CoD. To get to this stage, it may prove necessary to eliminate single items that simply refuse to scale and it may even prove necessary to set aside, at least temporarily, individual countries whose patterns of regime change are “exceptional.” Before taking such measures it seems more appropriate to first stick to the less demanding assumption of a one-dimensional, non-cumulative (Likert) scale, i.e. to skip the idea of a hierarchical ordering of the items in terms of their difficulty and just test whether they all measure the same underlying dimension.

<sup>13</sup> There is one liberalization item missing from our list that has recently received a lot of attention in the literature, namely, “protection of minority rights.” As awareness grew that regime change could exacerbate ethno-linguistic and religious conflicts, observers began to conclude that constitutional/legal provisions guaranteeing the autonomous status and resources of minority groups might be called for. Leaving aside the persistent tension, in principle, between the traditional liberal emphasis on individualistic and universalistic rights and the claims by specific groups for collective rights and exemptions (Offe article), the fact that, in practice, the polities that concern us have very different social compositions and sensitivities to this issue lead us not to include this item.

<sup>14</sup> Actually, a more specific hypothesis would be: By time that liberalization on all seven items has been accomplished, there is a high probability that the polity will **already** have entered into its transition to democracy.

**Figure 1: The Seven Items of the LoA Scale**

L-1	Significant public concessions at the level of human rights
L-2	No or almost no political prisoners
L-3	Increased tolerance for dissidence/public opposition
L-4	More than 1 legally recognized independent political party
L-5	At least 1 recognized opposition party in Parliament or constituent assembly
L-6	Trade unions or professional associations not controlled by state agencies or government parties
L-7	Independent press and access to alternative means of information tolerated by government

It should be noted in passing, however, that none of the seven items imply that rulers are actually being held accountable to citizens through the competition and cooperation of their representatives/politicians – which is our definition of democracy. Nor are they related to each other strictly by definition. Having an opposition party in parliament does not mean that this party has any power or that the parliament itself has the capacity to overturn actions taken by the executive, much less to change its composition. It also does not imply that elections that placed that opposition in parliament were “free and fair.” A polity can make human rights “concessions” and still keep its opponents in jail. While there may be a strong likelihood that more than one party has to have been legally recognized before an opposition party can gain access to parliament, the inverse is certainly not necessary: more than one independent party can be recognized, but not win (or be allowed to win) enough votes to be represented in parliament.<sup>15</sup> Trade unions and professional associations can be free from government control or tightly controlled by the government – whether or not more than one party exists. Many liberalized autocracies continue to imprison some categories of political opponents while allowing others to form political parties and sit in parliament. Finally, even in otherwise thoroughly liberalized regimes, agents of repression in the military and police can continue violating the human rights of citizens with impunity.

### ***Trying to Scale the Mode of Transition***

According to the ‘natural’ model used by practitioners (Carothers) and the ‘theoretical’ model developed by academics (O’Donnell & Schmitter), liberalization and democratization are not related to each other in a linear or inevitable fashion. Between the two “phases,” with their different actors and processes, lies the **transition**. Virtually all observers of regime change agree that this involves a more or less lengthy period of exceptional politics whose outcome is more or less uncertain. They also agree that there is no one way by which the transition from one regime to another is accomplished – if it is accomplished at all. Actors with newly acquired identities and ill-defined followers interact without being constrained by “customary” rules or legal norms and they will have been (at least, partially) empowered to do so by the process of liberalization itself. Their behaviors are difficult to predict, not just because they are bound to be relatively inexperienced and not very well-informed, but also because many of the pre-political social and cultural categories they pretend to represent are likely to be internally divided over the preferred outcome or even over the merits of regime change itself.

Where these observers disagree is over the longer-term significance of differences in the mode of transition. For orthodox structuralists and rationalists, the interim period is merely “noise.” The outcome will be determined either by such relatively fixed conditions as the level of development, the rate of economic growth, the proximity to Western culture, the incentives provided by “the world system,” *e così via*, or by the strategic choice of elites who will inexorably select that particular set of rules which will minimize transaction costs and maximize the distribution of benefits among them.

“Transitologists” argue that the pacts and improvised measures that hurried, imperfectly informed and largely inexperienced politicians make during this period of exceptional uncertainty

<sup>15</sup> It is also possible that elections may be convoked in such a fashion that no prior legal definition exists of what a party is and different groups “improvise” in the nomination of candidates. Something like this seems to have taken place in the former Soviet Union and may have been characteristic of the initial elections in several of the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

reflect highly unstable relations of power and yet can produce relatively enduring rules that will guide the subsequent regime – determining not so much whether it will be democratic or not, but what type of democracy it will be.

We decided that, while it was not an objective of this research to test these rival hypotheses, it would be useful to develop and include a set of indicators to measure the mode of transition so that, eventually, its relevance could be assessed along with those factors usually named in the literature, such as level of development, rate of growth, or economical past, just to mention a few.

**Figure 2: The Eight Items of the MoT Scale**

M -1	Social/political movements opposing the existing regime enter into public negotiations with it
M -2	Open and acknowledged conflicts within administrative apparatus of the state over public policies
M -3	Formal legal changes introduced to limit arbitrary use of powers by regime
M -4	Constitutional or legal changes introduced that eliminate the role of non-accountable powers of veto-groups
M -5	Constitution drafted and ratified that guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all citizens
M -6	Founding elections held
M -7	They have been free and fair
M -8	Their results have been widely accepted

In Figure 2 we have displayed the items selected to measure MoT. Since it is beyond the intentions of this particular piece of research to analyze these data extensively, just a few comments are in order:

If the literature on modes of transition is correct, there is no expectation that the eight items will form a scale or be tightly correlated. What we should find (or, better, be able to generate) is a set of nominal categories that cannot be reduced to a single dimension.

The ‘transitological’ hypothesis would be that countries scored in this nominal fashion as having qualitatively different modes of transition should exhibit significant quantitative differences in their subsequent consolidation of democracy, i.e. in our CoD scale.

There is, however, an exception to comment (1) in that the last three items all dealing with the convoking and holding of initial elections are very likely to prove to be significantly correlated with each other – so much so that it may be more useful to blend them into a single indicator.<sup>16</sup>

In retrospect, it seems desirable to extend the items in MoT to include two more items: one for the presence or absence of violence; another for the level of mass mobilization, since both of these factors have been emphasized in the theoretical literature.<sup>17</sup>

Both practitioners and theorists seem to understand that the consolidation of democracy is not guaranteed even by the most successful liberalization – unless something “intervenes” to push the process of regime change beyond the initially limited intentions of autocratic incumbents and/or the initially limited powers of their opponents. And that is what we have tried (imperfectly) to capture with the MoT scale. What are the intermediate actions – formal and informal – that can bring about a significant and predictable change in the distribution of the power to govern and in the accountability of those who do govern to the citizenry as a whole? No doubt, the convocation of “founding elections” and the drafting/ratifying of a new or revised constitution are the two most salient events that tend to punctuate the transition, but less visible processes of “pacting” between incumbents and

<sup>16</sup> The assumption is the following: If a country does decide, by unilateral imposition or by multilateral pact, to hold a “founding election” under different rules than before and that these elections include the full range of political forces, it is then likely that these elections will be held in a “free and fair” manner (or else, they would be deprived of the “foundingness”). If this is the case, then, there is a relative low probability that its results will be contested. If the empirical data do bear out this assumption, the obvious operational response is to merge all of the criteria into a single measurement called “holding an effective founding election.”

<sup>17</sup> (Karl/Schmitter 1991)

opponents and more tumultuous events involving the “resurrection” of civil society also can play a key role.

### ***Trying to Scale the Consolidation of Democracy***

The transitional period is over when virtually all of those active in politics agree that a regression either to the *statu quo ante* or to any other form of autocracy is highly improbable. Another way of putting it is that, when politicians stop looking over their shoulder for forces that might remove them from government or opposition by force, they can finally get down to “normal politics,” i.e. to wheeling and dealing with each other. Having reached this putative point of no return, however, does not guarantee that the country has found some appropriate type of democracy and been able to consolidate it.

Given the controversial nature of the concept itself, it should come as no surprise that observers differ considerably on what criterion (or criteria) should be applied to determine when a democratic regime can be reliably described as “consolidated.” Some of this disagreement can be traced all the way back to different conceptions of democracy, but some of it is related to more immediate political concerns. Both practitioners and academics seem very reluctant to commit themselves to making any such an unambiguous declaration. For the former, this may mean that he or she can no longer claim exceptional status for actions supposedly taken in order to “preserve the prospect of democracy.” What is more, once there is a widespread public recognition that democracy has indeed been consolidated and these “real-existing” institutions are it, a sense of *desencanto* (disenchantment) is bound to emerge since whatever these institutions are they are very likely to be less and do less than the public expected during the heady days of the transition. As for academics, signing such a certificate and, in doing so, implying that the regime is likely to persist in more-or-less its present configuration for the foreseeable future, places him or her in the uncomfortable position of being potentially and blatantly disowned by subsequent developments.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, as critical intellectuals, it seems somehow complacent to admit that these neo-democracies have arrived – especially when, as we shall see, most of them are not of such great quality.

**Figure 3: The Twelve Items of the CoD Scale**

C-1	No significant political party advocates major changes in the existing constitution
C-2	Regular elections are held and their outcomes respected by public authority and major opposition parties
C-3	They have been free and fair
C-4	No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions
C-5	Electoral volatility has diminished significantly
C-6	Elected official and representatives not constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto group within countries
C-7	1 <sup>st</sup> rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established
C-8	2 <sup>nd</sup> rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established
C-9	Agreement, formal and informal, on association formation and behavior
C-10	Agreement, formal and informal, on executive format
C-11	Agreement, formal and informal, on territorial division of competence
C-12	Agreement, formal and informal, on rules of ownership and access to media

There are many more items in Figure 3 than in the previous two and that is a reflection of the diversity of opinion surrounding the concept of CoD. Our objective has not been to focus on the indicators that we consider most appropriate, but to test for the empirical correlates of a wide range of conditions that different authors have proposed. The twelve items represent political accomplishments of a different order of magnitude and facility of measurement. All make reference to the behavior of the (political) actors. Inevitably, they have an “electoralist” bias, i.e. it is presumed that if elections of

<sup>18</sup> Even more so if the scholar has been one of those, especially numerous in CEE, who predicted that such a consolidation was either logically or empirically impossible – given the “post-communist” nature of the *ancien régime*, its “Marxist-Leninist” political culture and/or the sheer magnitude of tasks that had to be simultaneously performed.

some uncertain outcome are held fairly and regularly between competing parties, then, social and other conflicts will be channeled through that form of representation, elected officials will be able to act legitimately in resolving those conflicts and citizens can hold these persons and parties accountable by voting for their opponents. To the best of my knowledge, no one has been able to come up with a vision of a consolidated (“modern, liberal, political”) democracy that does not reflect this set of assumptions.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, items 6, 9, 10, 11 and 12 all refer to other mechanisms of representation that citizens can potentially use to hold their rulers accountable.

The footnotes to Figure 3 are also longer than in the other two scales and that reflects greater intrinsic difficulties in making reliable judgments about these items – especially ones that can safely be dichotomized. A few, (e.g. electoral volatility), can be measured by relatively standard quantitative indicators; others (e.g. the “freedom and fairness” of elections) require complex normative judgements that have shifted over time. Virtually no democracy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century held elections that would be considered “free and fair” by today’s standards. Even such an apparently simple judgement as “rotation-in-power” can become problematic in multi-party parliamentary systems where one has to assess whether certain shifts in the composition of those in government are somehow “functionally equivalent” to changes that are registered in a more obvious fashion in two-party presidential systems.<sup>20</sup> I will not even comment on the intrinsic difficulty in assessing how and when non-accountable actors (“*los poderes fácticos*” is the apposite Spanish expression) intervene to countermine the actions of accountable ones. Not only is this, virtually by definition, a secretive process in which the mere anticipation of a *golpe* or *incidente* may be enough to invoke conformity, but also it threatens to open a vast zone of ambiguity with regard to groups that are capable of withholding valuable material (“an investment strike” or “a flight of capital”) or cultural (“a moral crusade” or “an ecclesiastical excommunication”) resources from those in power.

Even something as apparently simple as assessing whether there exists a significant party that advocates major constitutional changes can become quite complicated. In the recent past, the existence of such a “non-liberal-democratic” (i.e. a Communist, Fascist or National Socialist) party that captured a significant proportion of votes might have been a plausible indication that the regime was not consolidated.<sup>21</sup> In the contemporary context, virtually all parties publicly proclaim that “democracy is the only game in town” (to use the criterion for CoD suggested by (Linz/Stepan 1996. What these dissenting parties tend to contest is whether their “freely and fairly” elected opponents are actually following the rules of the constitutional game or whether they are not unfairly exploiting their “incumbency resources.”

Our working hypotheses for Figure 3 are quite similar to those attached to Figure 1:

- (1) That all of the items chosen measure significant but different aspects of political democracy that are not exclusive to “Western” culture; therefore, they should be relevant and provide equivalent indicators in a wide diversity of cultural settings.
- (2) That these items are correlated in some consistent (if probabilistic) fashion within each subset of cases and, therefore, constitute a scale with which it should be possible to make ordinal and even cardinal measurements of the extent of progress toward the consolidation of democracy.

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<sup>19</sup> This single-minded reliance on parties and elections has not gone unchallenged. TK for electoralism; AP for the logic behind a minimalist conception of Democracy; For some skeptical (but not dismissive) comments on the exaggerated role that is usually attributed to political parties in this process of consolidation, see Schmitter ...

<sup>20</sup> If one does not entertain this possibility, the national regime in Switzerland – one of the most ultra-consolidated in virtually every other respect – would not qualify fully. Even at the communal and cantonal levels, there has almost never been a rotation *in strictu sensu*.

<sup>21</sup> Although one should distinguish between the (largely rhetorical) rejection of “bourgeois democracy” and the fact that many Western communist parties played quite loyally according to its rules.

- (3) That when all twelve (or less) of the items/tasks have been accomplished, the polity being measured will have effectively completed its process of finding and consolidating some type of democracy that is legitimate in terms of its peculiar national circumstances.<sup>22</sup>
- (4) That when all the criteria have been satisfied, it will also be much more likely that this type of democracy will persist into the foreseeable future, since the different items will become increasingly causally related to each other making it difficult either for rulers to ignore them arbitrarily or for citizens to modify them casually.
- (5) Finally, success in consolidating some type of democracy does not, however, mean “the end of history” (i.e. the impossibility of imagining and implementing a superior form of political domination). Resistance to institutional change and entropy in performance, yes; but no assurance that new mechanisms of accountability and new ideals for collective action will not emerge and become hegemonic – as has happened several times during the past history of democracy.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Trying to Scale the Quality of Democracy***

Figure 4 contains seven items, all of which are very difficult to measure reliably. None of them define democracy as such (in the processual sense that we are using it), but all have been inferred by one author or another as likely and desirable products of the continuous functioning of “good” democratic institutions. A rapid glance at well-established democracies would confirm that they have differed considerably in all of these qualitative aspects – even if, one can detect some convergence in outcomes in recent decades in Western Europe.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, there is some reason to suspect that the items/tasks may be connected with each other – either causally or functionally – and that implies that they should scale. For example, greater participation in units of civil society and/or a broader dispersion of political resources may tend, over time, to produce greater social and economic equality through the pressures they exert upon public polity. Survey research indicates that increases in the sense of personal “political efficacy” are related to lowering electoral abstention at the level of individuals. The diffusion of the rule of law in different domains across the national territory can result in greater gender equality and more participation in interest associations and social movements – as people feel safer to act within such protected spaces. Much evidence on some of these matters has been gathered and analyzed at the micro-level of individuals, but we still do not know empirically how they cluster at the macro-level of whole polities.

**Figure 4: The Seven Items of the QoD Scale**

Q -1	Agreements on the partial regimes and constitution itself are effectively applied to all groups and territories
Q -2	Conditions of effective political competition are equal for most citizens and groups
Q -3	Effective participatory equality produced greater substantive (income) equality for most citizens and groups
Q -4	Voter turnout decreased or increased significantly, or remained the same over 3 successive national elections
Q -5	Membership in associations and movements increased and extended its coverage to a wide range of interests
Q -6	Individuals show an increasing tendency to regard themselves as “politically efficacious”
Q -7	Gender equality has improved

More than with the other three measurement instruments (LoA, MoT & CoD), inter-coder reliability in the pre-test proved difficult to reach. Judging the extent to which the constitution and

<sup>22</sup> This does not presume that they will all be adopting the same type of democracy and, even less, that these consolidated democracies will be of the same quality.

<sup>23</sup> (Dahl 1989)

<sup>24</sup> With the exception of Great Britain which has followed a qualitative pattern more similar to that of the United States than its EU “brethren.” Breen & Verdier

rules about major partial regimes are evenly applied across the national territory and “social surface” is obviously no easy task. Guillermo O’Donnell has popularized the notion of “brown areas” outside of major cities (and presumably outside of dominant ethnic groups or social classes) in which otherwise resolutely democratic norms are systematically ignored or violated – and suggested that this is especially characteristic of neo-democracies in Latin America where “the rule of law” has succeeded not preceded “the practice of democracy.”<sup>25</sup> But how can one measure the surface covered by these “brown areas” or the discrimination suffered by these “brown classes”? Even if one turned to examining court cases challenging the misapplication of norms, the risk would be to miss precisely those areas and classes in which violations were so systematic that no one imagined that legal recourse would be successful. The same is the case with greater equality in the conditions of political competition. Concession of the electoral franchise and freedom of association to all adults are by themselves two potentially important elements of formal equalization characteristic of all neo-democracies, but these rights can be exercised in very different ways. One “unobtrusive” indicator might be the margin of victory between political parties and/or the presence of stable competing sets of class associations on the grounds that these processes would tend to make citizens feel that their participation could make an active contribution and not just be a passive civic duty.

Changes in income and gender equality can be measured quantitatively across a large number of polities, but data on such attitudinal items as “sense of personal political efficacy” is much harder to come by on a comparative (not to mention, longitudinal) basis. The evolution of electoral participation over time is easy to measure, but not so easy to interpret. Virtually everywhere in neo-democracies, abstention tends to increase after they have had the “civic orgy” that usually accompanies their founding elections, but does this indicate relative citizen satisfaction and rational “free-riding” or growing disenchantment (*desencanto*) with the emerging class of politicians? Data on the diversity of purposes and membership of individuals in the organizations of civil society are notoriously hard to come by, and can easily be distorted. Seizing on one type of organization for which there exist data – whether it is trade unions or bowling societies – can be quite unrepresentative of collective actions that are occurring elsewhere in society.

So, for the moment, let us admit that we do not have the means to measure the QoD in a reliable fashion and to present our scores on these items. Our dependent variables will, therefore, be the liberalization of autocracy and the consolidation of democracy – with a sidelong look at the mode of transition. We will unfortunately not be in a position to assess whether these processes of regime change have (yet) been able to deliver the benefits that so many newly empowered citizens had anticipated. This is not an excuse to exclude QoD from the analysis of democratization – just an incentive to develop better indicators for it in the future.

## **Testing for the ‘Scalability’ of the Items**

We now have the instruments for measuring our two and a half dependent variables: the seven LoA items; the twelve CoD items and the eight MoT items. Thanks to the collaboration of *ricercatori* at the EUI, we have filled in the data matrix with scores for six CEE (the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) and five MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Palestine and Turkey) for the period 1980-1999. To this, we just recently were able to add 17 additional countries from Southern Europe, Latin America, and the former Soviet Republics. The data on these additional countries will be analyzed in a later section of this paper.

Each country is coded independently by at least two persons who were either from that country or currently conducting research on it. They are encouraged to make a dichotomous assessment on each item for the end of each year, although we did allow them to choose an intermediate point between 0 = NO (no accomplishment or appreciable effort with regard to this trait) and 1 = YES (this

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<sup>25</sup> (O’Donnell 1998)

trait has been accomplished or satisfied). The score (0.5) means something has been done with regard to this task during the relevant year, but it has not yet been completed. After having independently assessed the scores, the person(s) supervising the whole data generation process first detects the discrepancies in scores between coder 1 and coder 2. On the basis of this, the inter-coder reliability is assessed. Then, a meeting between the two coders and the supervisor is arranged. The aim of this meeting is to discuss the disagreements, settle them and to come up with a final data matrix that is approved by the two country coders and the supervising person. Not only must the latter guide the discussion between the two country experts, but he also has to make sure that the scores for different countries are in a meaningful relation. In other words, since many different researchers are working in this project, the supervising persons are responsible for the intra-country and the inter-country reliability of the data.

### ***The Liberalization ‘Scale’***

One of our major “operational” assumptions has been that the items themselves are universally applicable and collectively scalable. This does not mean that their frequencies and, hence, the implied difficulty of successfully completing them will be the same in CEE and MENA. Therefore, we will initially examine the results separately and only subsequently consider whether to combine them.

**Table 1: The LoA items ranked by frequency in CEE (1980-99)**

			weight
L-3	Increased tolerance for dissidence/public opposition	71	1
L-2	No or almost no political prisoners	70.5	1
L-4	More than 1 legally recognized independent political party	69.5	1
L-7	Independent press and access to alternative means of information tolerated by government	69	1
L-6	Trade unions or professional associations not controlled by state agencies or government parties	67	2
L-1	Significant public concessions at the level of human rights	64.5	3
L-5	At least 1 recognized opposition party in Parliament or constituent assembly	63.5	3

NB: The scores are on a maximum of 120 points (1 point per item for 6 countries X 20 years)

In Table 1, we have displayed the seven LoA items in terms of the relative frequency with which they were attained (and sustained) in our six Central & Eastern European countries from 1980 to 1999. Our presumption is that this rank ordering reflects the relative difficulty with which they were accomplished. This is why we give them different weights, which are displayed in Table 1, as well.

In CEE, the easiest aspects of political liberalization to accomplish seem to have been increase in the tolerance for opposition and expression of dissidence (L-3) and the absence of political prisoners (L-2). Very close behind in time and frequency came item L-4: presence of at least one independent party and L-7: independent press and alternative means of mass communication. Next came independent trade unions and associations (L-6). Finally came significant and public concessions of human rights (L-1) and the presence of an opposition party in parliament (L-5). However, what is particularly striking is the relatively tight clustering of all of these items and, as we shall see, their accomplishment within a short period of time.

**Table 2: The LoA Items ranked by frequency in MENA (1980-99)**

			weight
L-4	More than 1 legally recognized independent political party	71	1
L-5	At least 1 recognized opposition party in Parliament or constituent assembly	62	1
L-7	Independent press and access to alternative means of information tolerated by government	33.5	2
L-6	Trade unions or professional associations not controlled by state agencies or government parties	31.5	2
L-1	Significant public concessions at the level of human rights	24.5	2
L-3	Increased tolerance for dissidence/public opposition	23	2
L-2	No or almost no political prisoners	12	3

NB: The scores are on a maximum of 100 points (1 point per item for 5 countries X 20 years)





<b>Slovakia</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	<b>79.5</b>
<b>Bulgaria</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	<b>72</b>
<b>Romania</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	<b>69</b>

Table 5 shows few surprises for the CEE countries. Hungary is the clear winner having already begun its process of political liberalization before 1980 and advanced in a monotonic fashion until 1990 when it received a full score of 7 – which it has subsequently sustained. Poland is ranked second, being the only case in CEE of a regression toward autocracy when in 1981 a military coup removed its two previous liberal accomplishments: its 0.5 score on tolerance of dissidents (L-3) and its 0.5 score on independence of some trade unions (L-6). The Czech Republic and Slovakia (then, a single country) came in third, having begun its/their liberalization in 1987, shortly before the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Bulgaria and Romania came in last with little or no evidence of liberalization prior to this dramatic moment. In both cases however once the process started, the countries very quickly attained a full score of 7 and that has persisted ever since. By the end of the period, all of the CEE countries had converged upon the same “perfect” score.<sup>26</sup>

**Table 6: The Weighted Compound LoA Scores: CEE (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	<b>80-99</b>
<b>Hungar</b>	1	1	1	1	2.5	3	3	3.5	5	10.5	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	<b>151.5</b>
<b>Poland</b>	1.5	0	0	0	1.5	2	3	3.5	6	10	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	12	12	<b>135.5</b>
<b>Czech</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.5	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	<b>134.5</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.5	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	<b>134.5</b>
<b>Bulgari</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	10	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	<b>123</b>
<b>Romani</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	<b>119</b>

The technique of measurement we have chosen allows us to advance one step further. As suggested by Table 1 and Table 2, the pattern of frequency of the seven items has differed, both within and across the two regions. From this, we can infer that some aspects of the process of political liberalization have been more difficult to achieve than others and we can use those differences to weight the respective indices. Those that everyone manages to attain (and sustain) can be considered less important than those relatively few have attained (or sustained). Without this weighting our measurement device could give the same score to a country that had accomplished several minor tasks and one that accomplished fewer, but more difficult, tasks. In Table 6, we have introduced this element of weighting for the CEE countries.<sup>27</sup>

In our Central & Eastern European sample, the weighting of scores makes little difference. The rank-order is the same. The raw scores are only a bit more spread-out with Hungary moving farther ahead of Poland and Romania lagging farther behind of Bulgaria. This is an encouraging sign since it is a first hint that the scalability of the items is high.

**Table 7: The Compound LoA Scores for All Items: MENA (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	80-99
Morocco	3	3	3	3	3	3	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	81
Egypt	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	2.5	2.5	3	3	3	3	3	3	63
Turkey	0	0	0	0	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	57
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	4.5	3	3	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	40
Palestine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	3	2.5	16.5

<sup>26</sup> The reader is reminded that this “perfect liberalization” is only based on the seven generic items/tasks that we selected. It is quite possible that on other criteria – for example, minority rights or toleration of sexual freedom – these countries could still differ considerably.

<sup>27</sup> In order not to inflate their importance, we have grouped the response frequencies in 3 and 4 weights, respectively.

For the MENA countries, there is at least one puzzling finding in these simple cumulative indices, namely, the relatively low score for Turkey. The winner in terms of liberalization is Morocco having begun the period with three points, i.e. having more than one legally recognized party (L-4), at least one opposition party in parliament (L-5), a few trade unions not controlled by the state (L-6) and a semi-independent press (L-7). In 1986, it improved its score to a modest, but significant, level of 4.5 and it has sustained that score until 1999.<sup>28</sup> Egypt's aggregate score of 63 is considerably below Morocco's score of 81, but that still qualifies it for second place overall in our MENA subset.

However, this was compiled at the expense of a great deal of back-and-forth fluctuation during the entire time period and it ends the scoring with a total of only 3 (it began with 2.5) which places it toward the bottom of the pack. Turkey began with an aggregate score of 0 due to autocratic rule by its military, but quickly moved to 4.5 with the restoration of civilian government in 1984. It, however, subsequently slipped back to 3.0. Considering that Turkey is presently a candidate for full EU membership, along with all of the CEE countries, its liberalization score is far below theirs. It continues to score 0 on items L-1 (human rights), L-2 (political prisoners) and L-3 (lack of tolerance for dissent) – all related to its on-going effort to suppress the political aspirations of its Kurdish minority. Predictably, Algeria and Palestine are on the bottom of the aggregate ranking, although the former had a brief spurt of liberalization in 1989-90 when its score of 5 was the highest attained by any of our MENA countries. The scores for Palestine have fluctuated between 1 and 3.5 since 1993 with no apparent cumulative tendency. By the end of the period, none of the MENA countries was even close to a perfect score of 7 and there was evidence of steady monotonic progress in only one country: Morocco.

**Table 8: The Weighted Compound LoA Scores: MENA (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	80-99	
Morocco	4	4	4	4	4	4	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	129	
Egypt	3	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	86
Turkey	0	0	0	0	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	85
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9.5	9.5	8	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	6.5	66.5	
Palestine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	6.5	2.5	4	4	5	4	27.5	

The weighted scores in this subset are also not radically different from the raw scores. The rank order is the same; only the internal distribution changes. The gap between Morocco's performance in political liberalization and that of Egypt widens; Turkey looks a bit less bad relative to Egypt; Algeria moves up a bit and, finally, Palestine moves further back at the end of queue.

\* \* \*

Comparing the two regions, we do find differences in the patterns of political liberalization over time. All of the CEE countries attain high scores (6,5-7,0) within two years of the collapse of their previous autocracies. With the minor exception of Poland at the beginning of the period, none of them regresses from its previous level. No MENA country ever attains such a high level of liberalization (the highest score being 5 for Algeria in 1989-90) and all but Morocco show manifest signs of episodic "back-tracking" (e.g. Algeria from 5,0 to 2,5; Egypt from 3,5 to 2,5; Palestine from 3.5 to 1.5; Turkey from 4,5 to 3,0).

One possible reason for the disparity can be found in differences between the respective modes of transition. Regime change was either brought about by a process of 'pacting' between autocratic incumbents and democratic challengers (Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria) or by large-scale mobilization from below that brought about a rapid collapse in the *ancien régime* (Romania and Czechoslovakia). In the MENA countries, no autocracy collapsed and whatever steps were taken toward liberalization

<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the recorded scores do not (yet) reflect any changes in policy that might have occurred since Mohammed ?? succeeded to power upon the death of his father, Hassan II, in ????.

remained continuously under the control of the incumbent regime – and, as we have seen, they could be (and were) retracted relatively easily.

So, these results should not seem unexpected or counter-intuitive, but they do raise the question whether or not one should use the same scale for political liberalization to measure change in such different environments – especially when, as we saw above, the specific items seem not to have followed the same “logic of difficulty.” .

### ***The Mode of Transition ‘Scale’***

A difference between MoT and our two main dependent variables, LoA and CoD, is that we have less reason to expect that items describing it will form a single reproducible scale. What the literature stresses are distinctive, i.e. nominal, **situations** rather than generic **processes**. These contexts may or may not alter the probability of different outcomes, but they are unlikely to affect them in some linear or incremental fashion. Another way of putting this point is that LoA and CoD involve coming up with **standardized** and, often, **imitative** responses in some sequential fashion; whereas, MoT involves discovering **customized** and **improvised** solutions to fleeting issues.

Keeping these conceptual thoughts in mind, let us first look separately at how the eight individual items performed in our two regions.

**Table 9: The MoT items ranked by frequency in CEE (1980-99)**

			weight
M-2	Open and acknowledged conflicts within administrative apparatus of the state over public policies	69.5	1
MoT-3	Formal legal changes introduced to limit arbitrary use of powers by regime	66	2
MoT-1	Social/political movements opposing the existing regime enter into public negotiations with it	64.5	2
MoT-4	Constitutional or legal changes introduced that eliminate the role of non-accountable powers of veto-groups	61.5	3
MoT-6	Founding elections held	61	3
MoT-5	Constitution drafted and ratified that guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all citizens	51	4
MoT-7	They have been free and fair	50.5	4
MoT-8	Their results have been widely accepted	45.5	4

For the CEE countries we again find a relatively compact set of scores. For MoT they varied between 45.5 and 69.5; whereas, for LoA they ranged from 63.5 to 71.0. Open and publicly acknowledged conflict within the state apparatus (M-2) was the most frequently attained item, followed by formal legal changes to limit arbitrary powers (M-3) – presumably before the drafting and ratification of a constitution (M-5) which ranked further down. Public negotiations with opponents (M-1) was the third most frequent event – a reflection of the relative frequency with which transitions in Eastern Europe involved the convocation of some sort of “round-table.” Contrary to our earlier expressed fears that the convocation of a “founding election” (M-6) would almost automatically involve their ‘free and fair’ conduct (M-7) and their uncontestability (M-8), there seems to have been some variation in the occurrence of these events.

**Table 10: The MoT items ranked by frequency in MENA (1980-99)**

			weight
MoT5	Constitution drafted and ratified that guarantees equal political rights and civil freedoms to all citizens	49.5	1
MoT4	Constitutional or legal changes introduced that eliminate the role of non-accountable powers of veto-groups	31.5	2
MoT6	Founding elections held	30	2
MoT2	Open and acknowledged conflicts within administrative apparatus of the state over public policies	25	3
MoT3	Formal legal changes introduced to limit arbitrary use of powers by regime	22	3
MoT7	They have been free and fair	19	4
MoT8	Their results have been widely accepted	19	4
MoT1	Social/political movements opposing the existing regime enter into public negotiations with it	1	4

In accordance with our assumption about “customization,” the frequency of the eight items in the MENA countries was different. The drafting and formal ratification of a (nominally) liberal constitution (M-5) turned out to be the easiest not one of the more difficult things to accomplish. Founding elections (M-6) were less likely to be held at all, but when they were, they happened more frequently (and presumably earlier) than either acknowledging open conflicts within the administration (M-2) or introducing restrictions on arbitrary powers (M-3). In fact, while these restrictions preceded constitutional drafting and ratification in CEE, they came later in MENA – an unobtrusive indicator that formally liberal constitutions may disguise informally illiberal behavior by state agents. The most difficult item for MENA countries to “acquire” was to enter into public negotiations between incumbents and opponents (M-1).

\* \* \*

As was unexpectedly the case with LoA, the items in MoT do **not** scale in the same fashion in CEE and MENA, as was expected. The frequency of occurrence, their implied difficulty of attainment and, hence, the weightings for the compound scale were different enough that different weighting procedures have to be used to create comparable indicators.

One could use the raw scores to generate a set of “modal” transitions, even if there are almost as many types as there are occurrences. Any country scoring 0 on all eight items could be said to have had a **non-transition**. None of the CEE cases fits this pattern, but two of the MENA ones do: Palestine and Algeria (except for a brief moment of imposition). Countries scoring positively on only items 5 & 4 (that have to do only with liberal constitutionalism) had **nominal transitions**. Again, none of the CEE cases fit, but Egypt does. Those cases in which items 1, 2, 6, 7 & 8 were all positive could be labeled as having had **successful pacted transitions**. Hungary and Poland are the only instances of this in our sample.<sup>29</sup> Those with a “+” in items 1, 2 & 6 but a “-“ in 7 and/or 8 could be said to have had **less successful pacted transitions**. Bulgaria is the only case among the twelve. Finally, there are the instances of **successful imposed transitions** in which no public negotiations with opponents took place (item 1), some open factionalism within the ruling elite was acknowledged (item 2) and all the electoral items (6,7 & 8) were positive. Romania fits this syndrome in CEE; Morocco and Turkey do in MENA (although less successfully in terms of the fairness and acceptability of elections).

### ***The Consolidation ‘Scale’***

Our theoretical assumptions for the CoD items are roughly the same as for the LoA items: they should be universally applicable across our two “regions” and they should form a reproducible scale. Whether this scale is identical in terms of relative frequency and implied difficulty is something that remains to be seen. We will proceed as before by examining the scores separately and only subsequently consider whether they could be combined into a single CoD.

**Table 11: The CoD Items ranked by frequency in CEE (1980-99)**

			Weight
C-2	Regular elections held and their outcomes are respected by public authority and major opposition parties	60	1
C-6	Elected official and representatives not constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto group within countries	58.5	1
C-9	Agreement, formal and informal, on association formation and behavior	58.5	1
C-3	They have been free and fair	58	1

<sup>29</sup> Czechoslovakia “looks” like a pacted case from the raw scores, but the “Round Table Talks” that took place there came after, for all intents and purposes, the *ancien regime* had already been defeated in the streets and only involved last minute “house-keeping” matters. This was a case of what Terry Karl and I have called “reformist” mode of transition in which the impulse comes from below and incumbents are compelled to exit under terms they neither control nor negotiate.

C-4	No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions	55	2
C-10	Agreement, formal and informal, on executive format	53	2
C-12	Agreement, formal and informal, on rules of ownership and access to media	37.5	3
C-11	Agreement, formal and informal, on territorial division of competence	36	3
C-7	1 <sup>st</sup> rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established	33	3
C-1	No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution	27.5	3
C-5	Electoral volatility has diminished significantly	16	4
C-8	2 <sup>nd</sup> rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established	16	4

Three items stand out in Table 11 as having been attained relatively early on and persisted without change in CEE. The first, no evidence of constraints coming from non-elected veto groups (C-6), confirms the widespread assumption that since civilian control over the military was asserted under the communist regime it will persist under a democratic one.<sup>30</sup> The second and third items, agreement on the rules concerning the formation of interest associations and social movements (C-9) and consensus on the format of executive power (C-10), are a bit more puzzling since both have been subject to considerable attention within the region and their resolution could presumably have generated considerable conflict. Next comes a cluster of “electoral items:” Regular elections and respected outcomes (C-2); ‘free and fair’ conduct of elections (C-3); No significant parties rejecting the way elections were conducted (C-4).

Next, we venture unto more difficult terrain: agreement on rules for the mass media (C-12); agreement on the territorial division of *compétences* (C-11); rotation in power or major shift in alliances (C-7) and the absence of a significant party demanding changes in the constitution (C-1). Finally, two items were unambiguously the most difficult for the CEE countries to accomplish: diminish electoral volatility (C-5) and produce a second rotation-in-power (C-8). Now, since the last one is just an artifact of the impossibility of having a second rotation until after the polity has had a first one, what definitely emerges as the winner/loser from this subset is the problematic institutionalization of a stable party system.

**Table 12: The CoD Items ranked by frequency in MENA (1980-99)**

			weight
C-9	Agreement, formal and informal, on association formation and behavior	26.5	1
C-11	Agreement, formal and informal, on territorial division of competence	21.5	2
C-10	Agreement, formal and informal, on executive format	20	2
C-2	Regular elections held and their outcomes are respected by public authority and major opposition parties	19.5	2
C-4	No significant parties or groups reject previous electoral conditions	19.5	2
C-3	They have been free and fair	16.5	2
C-7	1 <sup>st</sup> rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established	12	3
C-6	Elected official and representatives not constrained in their behavior by non-elected veto group within countries	11.5	3
C-12	Agreement, formal and informal, on rules of ownership and access to media	9.5	3
C-1	No significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution	8.5	3
C-8	2 <sup>nd</sup> rotation-in-power or significant shift in alliances of parties occurred within the rules established	7	3
C-5	Electoral volatility has diminished significantly	0	3

The first thing that emerges from the MENA scores on the CoD items is their much lower frequency. There is virtually no overlap in the aggregate frequency scores. They range from 0 to 26.5 in MENA and from 16 to 58.5 in CEE.

The second impression is that, compared to the differences in the rank-ordering of LoA items, the CoD items are more consistent in their (implied) difficulty across the two sub-sets. Second rotation (C-8) and diminished electoral volatility (C-5) are rated at the bottom in both MENA and CEE –

<sup>30</sup> Poland is the obvious exception, having been governed by its military from 1981-1989 (/), but even in this case there were obvious complications with the previous civilian rulers. Romania also experienced some “military intervention” during its tumultuous regime change, the nature of which is still unclear and does not seem to have persisted once democratic institutions were installed.

although perhaps for different reasons. Agreements on association formation (C-9) and executive format (C-10) have been among the easiest in both regions.<sup>31</sup> MENA seems to have been spared controversies over the internal division of territorial *compétences* (C-11) more than CEE – which could be due either to a “cultural” consensus on extremely centralized regimes or the failure of the issue to emerge at such an early stage of regime change. The scores on the electoral items (C-2, C-3 & C-4) are relatively close, as they were in CEE, which strengthens the possibility that they might be collapsed into a single item. The only item in Table 11 and

**Table 12** to be markedly “out of order” is C-6: the constraining role of non-elected officials. Needless to say, this is a reflection of the virtually endemic role played by the armed forces in the politics of all of the MENA countries.

**Table 13: The Cumulative CoD Scores for All Items: CEE (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	80-99
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	7.5	8.5	9	9.5	9	9.5	10	11	11	93
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	9	9	10	10	11	11	87
Czech	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6.5	7.5	8	8	8.5	8.5	9	9	10.5	10	85.5
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	8	7.5	6	8	10	10	7.5	10.5	10.5	83
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	8	8	10.5	10.5	82
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5.5	7	7	7	7	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	78.5

In Table 13 we have presented rankings based on the simple cumulative scores of the CoD items for our six CEE countries. They are quite puzzling and present a serious challenge to one of the basic underlying “hunches” in the democratization literature. All things being equal, we would have expected a rank-order correlation between the aggregate LoA and CoD scores, i.e. those countries that had been most successful in liberalization should also do best in the consolidation of their respective democracies. But this is apparently not the case if one contrasts Table ? and Table ?? Hungary, the clear winner in LoA (and also in MoT) is ranked on the bottom of CoD. Bulgaria which was fifth in LoA (rising to 4<sup>th</sup> in MoT) comes out a surprising 2<sup>nd</sup> in CoD. The findings for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania are more consistent. How could this be? Why did Hungary score so low and Bulgaria so well on the Consolidation Scale?

Looking at the raw scores reveals a potentially serious flaw in our measurement scheme. After its founding elections in 1990, the Hungarian government remained continuously in power until elections were held in 1994; whereas, in all the other CEE countries the second elections were held earlier. To avoid double-counting, we chose not to score positively items C-2, C-3 & C-4 until these subsequent elections proved to be “free and fair” and accepted by all. In other words, our initial scoring arrangement “punished” Hungary for the regularity of its electoral system. It also did relatively poorly on items C-11 (territorial division) and, especially, C-12 (rules for mass media). If we correct for this and consider that *ex post* it was demonstrated that the founding election was followed by other regular, “free and fair” that were respected by public authorities and losing parties, Hungary’s relative standing improves – as do all of the aggregate CEE scores for CoD.

**Table 14: The Cumulative CoD Scores for All Items: MENA (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	80-99
Turkey	0	0	0	2.5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	6	80.5
Morocco	1	1	1	1	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	4	37
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	2.5	2.5	3	2.5	3	3.5	3.5	3.5	33
Palestine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.5	3	2	2	2	11.5
Egypt	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	10

<sup>31</sup> Reference to recent controversies in Egypt over the Law for Associations.

The simple cumulative scores for the five MENA countries on the CoD items are more in line with expectations than was the case with CEE. Turkey emerges as the clear winner – far ahead of the other four. It had even attained a level of consolidation by 1999 that exceeded four of the six CEE countries and tied it with Bulgaria (80.5). Obviously, had the data series started earlier, it would have revealed that Turkey has been trying to play the “democratization game” for much longer than any of the others and, therefore, could rely on more “acquired assets” than its competitors in either MENA or CEE once its latest transition had begun. Turkey did not, however, rate highest in the LoA scale from 1980 to 1999, but that was due to its poor start under military rule until 1984. The only marked exception that seems in need of a “deviant case analysis” is Egypt. It had the second highest LoA score (but based on a very erratic performance) and yet fell to the bottom on the CoD items – just a fraction below Palestine. Otherwise, the CoD scores of Morocco, Algeria and Palestine are about where one would have predicted on the basis of what they had accomplished (or not accomplished) in terms of liberalization.

**Table 15: The Weighted Compound CoD Scores: CEE (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	80-99
Poland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	9	15	17	19.5	20.5	20	20.5	22	25	25	187.5
Czech	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	18.5	18.5	21.5	21.5	25.5	25.5	165
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12.5	13.5	15.5	15.5	17	17	19	19	23.5	23	164.5
Bulgaria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9.5	16	14.5	11.5	18	22	22	15	23.5	23.5	164.5
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	13.5	13.5	14	14	15.5	15.5	17	17	24	24	156
Romania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	8.5	12	12	12	12	23	23	23	23	143.5

**Table 16: The Weighted Compound CoD Scores: MENA (1980-99)**

	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	80-99
Turkey	0	0	0	6	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	8.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	11.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	14.5	184
Morocco	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	8.5	8.5	71
Algeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	4	4	5.5	4	5	6.5	6.5	6.5	57
Egypt	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	30
Palestine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1	7	4	4	4	24

Once we weigh the items in terms of their relative difficulty, we find no difference in the rank-orders within the two regions, but Turkey’s accomplishment in CoD emerges as much more significant. Indeed, its weighted score of 184 places it ahead of all of the CEE countries except Poland! When this is joined with low LoA score, one is tempted to conclude that Turkey is a **democradura**, i.e. a consolidated illiberal democracy in which the mechanisms of electoral competition and partisan representation are relatively well-established while the civic rights (especially of minority groups) are not. Otherwise, as expected, the scores in Table 16 place the MENA countries “beyond the pale” when it comes to consolidating democratic rules of the game.

### ***The ‘Crucial Test(s)’***

So far, we have described our way through the data on the three scales, applying the “interocular impact test” as a primitive method for discerning their internal structure. What we now need to know is whether the information contained in these items is interrelated and cumulative in a more rigorous statistical sense: is there a strong probability that countries having accomplished one item will have also accomplished others? If so, we can then proceed with confidence to aggregate them and to use these simple and weighted scores as dependent variables measuring progress (and regress) on the path from autocracy to consolidated democracy.

[Place Table 17 here]



One test is Cronbach's Alpha. It measures whether the items are sufficiently related to form a single underlying dimension and, as Table 17 shows, they pass with flying colors. If one takes .70 as the usual level of confidence, all three scales do well. Even when the samples are divided randomly into two parts and the scales run on each, the coefficients are significant. The only clear exception is MoT for the MENA countries (.4909). A more ambiguous one is CoD for these same countries (.7693). In every instance, the CEE sample demonstrates greater scalability than the MENA one – an unobtrusive indication that they form more of a “region” with common socio-economic and political experiences. What is a bit puzzling is the lesser but nevertheless high scalability of MoT when our “inter-ocular impact test” seemed to discern such significant differences that we were tempted to switch to a nominal level of measurement.

Even more surprising is the very high level of significance of the entire scale, i.e. the LoA, MoT and CoD scales lumped together. For all 27 items in all 12 countries for all of the 20 year time period, the coefficient is .9718 and it almost as high (.9553) when split into two “panels.” Cronbach's Alpha for all the variables in all CEE countries is even higher: .9897. The one for MENA alone is lower: .8910, but still very impressive. Those deviant case observations which we made above in our impressionistic first pass through the data seem to decline in significance when the whole 27x12x20 matrix is taken into account. .

## Progress towards Democratization in CEE and MENA

In Table 18, we present the values of the dependent variable(s) that we have so painstakingly assembled. We are now reasonably confident that all of them capture a common underlying dimension that no one of them can capture alone and even that, when used together, they describe accurately over time (at least for these countries and this time period) the extent to which democratization *in strictu sensu* has or has not been successful. What we are not sure of is whether this clustering in time and space is causal, i.e. whether the items involved were produced in a similar temporal order and whether the more frequent ones were “necessary and sufficient” for the acquisition of the less frequent ones.

**Table 18: THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE (1980-99)**

	<b>LoA</b>		<b>LoA(w)</b>		<b>MoT</b>		<b>MoT(w)</b>		<b>CoD</b>		<b>CoD(w)</b>
Hungary	92	Hungary	151.5	Hungary	90.5	Hungary	250.5	Poland	93	Poland	187.5
Poland	83	Poland	135.5	Czech	82	Czech	228	<b>Hungary</b>	87	<b>Czech</b>	165
Czech	79.5	Czech	134.5	Slovakia	82	Slovakia	228	<b>Czech</b>	85.5	<b>Hungary</b>	164.5
Slovakia	79.5	Slovakia	134.5	Bulgaria	75.5	Bulgaria	207.5	Bulgaria	83	Bulgaria	164.5
Bulgaria	72	Bulgaria	123	Poland	73	Poland	192	Slovakia	82	Slovakia	156
Romania	69	Romania	119	Romania	56.5	Romania	160	Romania	78.5	Romania	143.5
Morocco	81	Morocco	129	Morocco	75	Morocco	196	Turkey	80.5	Turkey	184
Egypt	63	Egypt	86	Turkey	49.5	Turkey	141	Morocco	37	Morocco	71
Turkey	57	Turkey	85	Egypt	48.5	Egypt	85.5	Algeria	33	Algeria	57
Algeria	40	Algeria	66.5	Algeria	17.5	Algeria	33	<b>Palestine</b>	11.5	<b>Egypt</b>	30
Palestine	16.5	Palestine	27.5	Palestine	6.5	Palestine	14	<b>Egypt</b>	10	<b>Palestine</b>	24

\*Countries designated in **bold** have changed their rank-ordering when moving from simple to weighted scores.

## APPENDIX I

### **Presenting Data on Seventeen Additional Countries from Southern Europe, South America, Central America and the Republics of the Former Soviet Union**

The main purpose of this (lengthy) appendix is to test how the raw data and their patterns of association collected on eleven countries in CEE and MENA compare with data that we subsequently collected for seventeen countries from Southern Europe (SE), South America (SA), Central America (CA), and the former Soviet Republics (FSR). This is an especially challenging test since the original “samples” were picked as part of a “most different systems” research design in which the CEE and MENA cases represented the opposite ends of a spectrum of experiences in regime change. The former had moved quickly beyond liberalization and transition well into consolidation; the later were manifestly struggling and taking much more time with the earliest aspects of liberalization, few (other than Turkey) could have been said to be “in transition” – much less “in consolidation.”

By adding the other 17, we have not only expanded the total ‘N’ and the range of cultures and geographic sites, but we have also filled in the middle-range of experience with the processes of regime change. Many of the cases in South and Central America and the former republics of the Soviet Union find themselves moving (and sometimes floundering) in that uncertain space between liberalization and consolidation. From a purely statistical point-of-view, this means that the distribution on our LoA and CoD scales should become much more “normal” and “bell-shaped,” rather than “bi-modal” and “dumbbell-shaped.”

The structure of the following text follows that of the previous chapters on CEE and MENA. First, we describe which of the LoA, MoT, and CoD items have been the most difficult and easiest ones to acquire and how these patterns differ across the regions. Second, we develop regionally specific weighting schemes for each of the LoA, MoT, and CoD items. This enables us to produce two scales for measuring each concept – one based on the simple aggregated scores and the other on the weighted aggregated scores, with the weights differing according to region-specific difficulties. Only then can we explore the similarities and differences between the 17 recently added countries and the 11 original CEE and MENA countries. *In grosso modo*, we expect that South America, Central America and the former Soviet Republics will tend to rank in the middle, i.e. higher than MENA and lower than CEE on all three scales. We also expect the Southern European countries (Spain, Greece, and Portugal) to be at the top of our rankings. As the earliest “surfers” on this wave of democratization, they should score as the most liberalized and the most consolidated of all of the countries experiencing regime change in this larger “sample” – but not necessarily because they chose the most propitious mode of transition.

Throughout the sections that follow, we are assuming that our different indicators for LoA, MoT, and CoD all measure the same underlying uni-dimensional phenomenon. In order to check whether this assumption is accurate, we will statistically test for uni-dimensionality in our final section. Let us begin with a discussion of the findings on our LoA data.

### **Liberalization of Autocracy<sup>2</sup> (LoA<sup>2</sup>)**

#### ***Frequency of LoA<sup>2</sup> Items***

In Table 19, we have displayed the original seven LoA items ranked by the frequency with which they were attained in our 17 new countries from four different regions between 1974 and 2000.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> In addition, we display the findings on the CEE and MENA countries from the previous section in the last two columns.

As mentioned before, we assume that this rank order reflects the region-specific relative difficulty of each item.

In Southern Europe (SE), six of the seven LoA items seem to have had roughly the same level of difficulty. The exception was Item L7 (independent press and access to alternative means of information) that appears to have been the most difficult one to accomplish during the liberalization processes in Spain, Greece, and Portugal. It was relatively easy for these three countries to have acquired at least one recognized independent party (L4) that was represented in Parliament (L5). In addition, Items L2 (almost no political prisoners) and L3 (increased tolerance for dissidence) were achieved easily and irrevocably.

The frequency distribution of the LoA items in our five South American (SA) countries differs from the one in SE. The most difficult traits to acquire in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia were L1 (significant public concession at the level of human rights) and L2 (almost no political prisoners). This probably reflects the fact that liberalization processes in this region of the world started from military dictatorship of particular severity. In the light of this, having trade unions and professional organizations not controlled by the state (L6) was relatively easier in SA than in SE. In both regions, L4 (more than one legally recognized independent political party) was the most frequently, easily and irrevocably achieved item.

As can be seen from Table 19, the frequency rankings for our three Central American (CA) countries was quite similar to that of the SA countries. This might be the result of the fact that Honduras and Guatemala (but not Mexico) started liberalizing from roughly the same point of autocratic departure, namely, military dictatorships. However, the variance in scores for the CA3 is much higher than for the SA5 or the SE3. Items L4 and L6 were relatively much easier and earlier to satisfy than Items L1 and L2.

**Table 19: The LoA items ranked by frequency (1974-1999/2000)**

SE			SA			CA			FSR			CEE			ME NA		
item	sum	weight	Item	sum	Weight	Item	sum	weight	Item	sum	weigh	item	sum	weigh	item	sum	weigh
L4	78	1	L4	105.5	1	L4	71	1	L3	44	1	L3	71	1	L4	71	1
L5	77	1	L6	102	1	L6	59.5	2	L4	41.5	1	L2	70.5	1	L5	62	1
L3	76.5	1	L5	89	1	L5	59	2	L5	38.5	2	L4	69.5	1	L7	33.5	2
L2	76	1	L3	83.5	2	L3	46	2	L2	37	2	L7	69	1	L6	31.5	2
L1	71.5	2	L7	77.5	2	L7	34.5	3	L1	36	2	L6	67	2	L3	24.5	2
L6	69.5	2	L2	59	3	L2	32	3	L6	34.5	2	L1	64.5	3	L1	23	2
L7	63.5	3	L1	50.5	3	L1	26	3	L7	28.5	3	L5	63.5	3	L2	12	3
∅	73		∅	81		∅	47		∅	37		∅	58		∅	38.2	
max*		11	max*		13	max*		16	Max*		13	max		<b>12</b>	max*		<b>13</b>

\*Maximum weighted score that can be achieved per country and year in the respective region

Not surprisingly, both the frequency and ranking of LoA items in the former Soviet Republics (FSR) differ markedly from those in SA and CA. What is astonishing, however, is to observe the similarity with ranking for the Southern Europe. In both of these world regions, L3, L4, and L5 were the easiest to acquire and L1, L6, and L7 were the most difficult. In both, Items L1 and L2 ranked in the middle.

Comparing these LoA frequency ratings with the ones for the CEE and the MENA countries in the last two columns of Table 119 reveals that none of the six regions shows exactly the same pattern of difficulty. Consequently, the weights for these items will be different for each region. They are displayed in Table 19. This procedure permits us to produce two slightly different LoA scales – one composed of the simple additive and another one composed of the weighted scores. The results of both can then be compared in order to see if they produce a different rank order of countries.

### ***Comparing the Simple LoA<sup>1</sup> and LoA<sup>2</sup> Scores***

Table 20 displays the sum of the seven LoA items per year and country, grouped into the 4 (+2) world regions. From this table, one can follow the development of the liberalization process in individual countries within each region as well as the differences in this process across regions. Let us begin with an intra-regional comparison of countries.

In Southern Europe, all three countries – Spain (162)<sup>33</sup>, Greece, (165), and Portugal (164) – rank almost exactly the same in terms of simple aggregate LoA. In contrast, in SA we find more variation in the LoA scores. Brazil (149) ranks first, followed by Argentina (117) and Bolivia (107), whereas Chile (83) and Peru (81) rank lowest. Intra-regional variation is high in CA as well: Mexico (143) ranks first, the second, Honduras (115), already displays a much lower score, and Guatemala's sum of scores (52) is almost just one-third of the Mexican one. In the FRS, Ukraine attains the highest score (72.5), followed by Russia (64), Georgia (58), and Belarus (45). The FRS is the only country group in which, at present, none of the countries achieves the maximum LoA score of 7. Even more, only one country has ever achieved it – Ukraine in the years from 1992 to 1994. However, Ukraine subsequently moves slightly backward, as do Russia and Belarus. Such a decline in the LoA scores only occurs in a few countries in other regions, e.g. Peru and, to a lesser extent, Honduras.

Notice, however, the intrinsic problem with comparing the sum of scores from different countries and deriving from this the extent of LoA: Most of the differences in the total scores are an artifact of differences in the point of departure. The earlier a country starts liberalizing, the higher its sum of scores because, once an item has been achieved and remains unchanged, its score accumulates over time. In addition to this, notice that this 'time-dependence problem' gets even bigger when countries from different regions are compared. For instance, Spain, Greece, and Portugal started their process of liberalization (and, subsequently, their processes of transition and consolidation) much earlier than, let's say, the Ukraine or Poland. Hence, the simple sum of (unweighted and weighted) scores not only reflects the attained level of LoA (as well as MoT and CoD), but also the number of years since the process started.

One way of correcting for this bias in favor of the 'early' democratizers is to divide the sum of scores by the number of years since the first trait has been acquired. The respective figures for the countries and regions are displayed in the last two rows of Table 20. In the following, we will concentrate on those rows that display the level of each country's and each region's LoA in percentages.

Having corrected for the time bias, the intra-regional rank order of countries changes in some of the cases. No changes in the rank order occur in SE. This is logical since – following our data - all three countries started their LoA process in the same year (1974). In SA, we have one case of an unusually long-lasting process of liberalization - Brazil (81.9%), which loses its first position in the LoA ranking once we correct for the time bias. The new SA leader is Argentina (83.6%), a country that started its LoA process in the early 80s and achieved the maximum score of 7 almost immediately after its defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas war and the subsequent collapse of its military dictatorship. Following the same pattern of a relatively short and successful liberalization of autocracy, Chile (65.9%) now ranks third and, thus, higher than Bolivia (59%) and Peru (44.6%). The latter always ranks last in SA, no matter whether the standardized or un-standardized scores are used. In CA, no changes in the country rankings occur, partly due to the fact that the two most liberalized countries in this region

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<sup>33</sup> The maximum score is 182 and would be attained, if a country were fully liberalized from 1974 onwards until 1999, i.e. if it achieved the maximum score of 7 throughout all the 26 years.

acquire their first LoA traits quite early in the 70s. In the FSR, Russia and Georgia change their ranking, the latter ranking higher once we correct for the time factor.

Comparing the time-corrected scores of countries across regions reveals some surprising results. Our three SE countries Spain (89%), Greece (90.7%), and Portugal (90.1%) all rank lower than two of the CEE countries, i.e. Bulgaria (93.6%) and Romania (98.6%) and only slightly higher than the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both 87.4%). To a certain extent, this can be explained by the fact that, by and large, it took the SE countries much more time than the CEE countries to liberalize completely. Greece and Portugal both spent 15 years before reaching the maximum LoA score; whereas, Bulgaria, Romania and the former Czechoslovakia needed less than three.



Table 20: Cumulative LoA scores

	Se			SA					CA			FSR				CEE						ME NA				
	Spain	Greece	Portugal	Argentina	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia	Peru	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	Ukraine	Russia	Georgia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Turkey	Algeria	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine
1974	1	4	1.5	0	0	2.5	1	0.5	3.5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	1	5.5	2.5	0	0	3	1	1	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	3	5.5	6	0	0	3	1	1	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	6.5	5.5	6	0	0	3	1	1	5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	6.5	5.5	6	0	0	4	2	2.5	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	6.5	5.5	6.5	0	0	5.5	2	2.5	5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	6.5	5.5	6.5	0.5	0	5.5	0	4.5	5	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2.5	3	0
1981	6.5	5.5	6.5	0.5	0	5.5	0.5	4.5	5	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	3	0
1982	6.5	6.5	6.5	0.5	0	5.5	5.5	4.5	5	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3.5	3	0
1983	6.5	6.5	6.5	3.5	0.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3.5	3	0
1984	6.5	6.5	6.5	7	0.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	5	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0.5	0	0	0	4.5	0	3.5	3	0
1985	7	6.5	6.5	7	0.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	5	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	4.5	0	3.5	3	0
1986	7	6.5	6.5	7	2	5.5	5.5	4.5	5	1	5	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	4.5	0	3.5	4.5	0
1987	7	6.5	6.5	7	3	5.5	5.5	4.5	5	1	5	1.5	2	0	0.5	0	1	2.5	2.5	0	1	4.5	0	3.5	4.5	0
1988	7	6.5	6.5	7	4	7	5.5	4.5	5.5	2	5	2	2.5	0	0.5	0	1.5	3.5	4	0	1.5	4.5	0	3.5	4.5	0
1989	7	7	7	7	4	7	5.5	4.5	5.5	4	5	3.5	3.5	2.5	0.5	3	7	6.5	6	0	7	4.5	5	3.5	4.5	0
1990	7	7	7	7	6	7	5.5	4	6.5	4	5	5.5	4	4.5	4	6	7	7	6.5	6	7	3	5	3.5	4.5	0
1991	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	4	6.5	4	5	6.5	4	5.5	6	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	4.5	3.5	4.5	0
1992	7	7	7	7	6.5	7	5.5	1	6.5	4	5	7	4	5.5	6	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	3	2.5	4.5	0
1993	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	2.5	6.5	4	5	7	6.5	5.5	6	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	3	2.5	4.5	1
1994	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	2.5	6.5	4	6	7	5.5	5.5	5.5	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	2.5	3	4.5	3.5
1995	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	2.5	6	4	5	6.5	6	5.5	4.5	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	2.5	3	4.5	1.5
1996	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	2.5	6	4	5	6.5	6	5.5	2.5	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	3.5	3	4.5	2.5
1997	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	2.5	6.5	4	5	6.5	6	6	3	7	7	7	6.5	7	7	3	3.5	3	4.5	2.5
1998	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	3	6.5	5	5	6.5	6	6	3	7	7	7	7	7	7	3	3.5	3	4.5	3
1999	7	7	7	7	7	7	5.5	3	7	5	5	6.5	6	6	3	7	7	7	7	7	7	3	4	3	4.5	2.5
74-99	162	165	164	117	83	149	107.5	81	143	52	115	72.5	64	58	45	72	79.5	92	83	69	79.5	57	40	63	81	16.5
Øre	163.5			107.5					103.5			60				79						36.9				
t-c %	<b>89</b>	<b>90.7</b>	<b>90.1</b>	<b>83.6</b>	<b>65.9</b>	<b>81.9</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>44.6</b>	<b>78.6</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>63.1</b>	<b>79.7</b>	<b>65.3</b>	<b>75.3</b>	<b>49.4</b>	<b>93.6</b>	<b>87.4</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>59.3</b>	<b>98.6</b>	<b>87.4</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>57.9</b>	<b>33.7</b>
Re %	<b>89.9</b>			<b>67</b>					<b>61.9</b>			<b>67.4</b>				<b>82</b>						<b>47.9</b>				





If we shift our perspective from single countries to regions and compare the regional means of the uncorrected LoA scores, we find the expected rank ordering across regions: SE (163.5) emerges as the most liberalized, followed by SA (107.5) and CA (103.5). By far the least liberalized region is FSR(60). Adding the regional means of CEE (79) and MENA (36.9) also produces the finding that we anticipated: SE, SA and CA rank higher than CEE and MENA is last, clearly behind FSR.

However, when making the inter-regional comparisons, we have to be particularly sensitive to the issue of time dependence. Hence, let us compare the regions according to their time-corrected regional means (Table 20, last two rows). SE (89.9%) remains the most liberalized region. It is now followed by the CEE (82%). Again, this rise in rank order reflects the extraordinary speed with which these countries liberalized their polities. In third position, we find SA (67%) and, somewhat surprisingly, the former Soviet republics (67.4%) that have overtaken the CA countries. Solidly in last place, we find MENA (47.9%). Before starting with the analysis of the mode of transition scores (MoT), let us finish the discussion of the LoA items by looking at the results of the weighted LoA scores.

### ***Comparing Weighted and Simple LoA<sup>2</sup> Scores***

As mentioned above, each region displays a different pattern of difficulty with the seven items. Based on this finding, we weighted the country scores by a region-specific formula. The weighted scores per country and year are displayed in Appendix 1. Furthermore we corrected the weighted scores for their time dependence by dividing each country's total score over time by the number of years since its LoA process began. LoA progress, therefore, is reported in percentages.<sup>34</sup>

In order to not to replicate the whole analysis we just made of the unweighted LoA scores, we have limited ourselves to checking whether countries change ranks when the weighted and time-corrected LoA scores are entered – both within their region and compared to countries from other regions. Column %t-c in Table 21 ranks the countries that reached higher LoA scores in less time. Column %t-c\_LoA(w) does the same and includes the dimension of item-difficulty. Hence, those countries that rank high on the t-c\_LoA(w) scale were not only the fastest in achieving and sustaining all of the LoA items, but also able to accomplish the most difficult ones faster.

First of all, the **intra**-regional ranking of countries shows virtually no changes when we use the weighted instead of the simple scores. The only exception to this is Southern Europe, where the initial rank order is turned upside down once we weigh our items. Secondly, if we look at the **inter**-regional rank ordering, only one significant change of positions occurs: Greece (85.3%) now ranks lower – behind Spain (89.5%) and Portugal (86.4%), but also behind Romania (99.2%), Bulgaria (93.2%), the Czech Republic (86.3%), and Slovakia (86.3%). A look at the raw data reveals that the reason for this seems to be that Greece did not fully accomplish item L7 (Independent press and access to alternative means of information) until the late 80s and this item is weighted most heavily.

The excessively poor and, to some extent, counter-intuitive performance of Peru, both in the simple and the weighted scores, is the result of several country-specific features. First, Peru started to accomplish its first LoA traits relatively early in the 70s. Once we correct the scores for time dependence, the country gets downgraded because so many other countries in our sample started to liberalize much later. Second, although it started the liberalization process relatively early, Peru has never been able to achieve the maximum LoA score of 7. Third, Peru is one of the few countries in which LoA items tended to decline over time – and not only during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori. Finally, those items that Peru was able to accomplish were the easier ones, which means that it does not improve its rank position when we take relative difficulty into account. At the bottom of

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<sup>34</sup> Notice that we can only use the percentages for the cross-regional comparisons as soon as we look at the weighted items. This is so, because the maximum scores for LoA (MoT, CoD) differs from one region to the other, due to the different weighting schemes we are applying.

both our rankings, we again find all of the MENA countries. Only Morocco (49.6%) and Algeria (46.6%) rank a bit higher.

**Table 21: Country ranking on simple and weighted LoA scales, based on time-corrected scores (1974-1999)**

	<b>t-c_LoA</b>	Rank change*	<b>t-c_LoA(w)</b>	
	<b>%</b>		<b>%</b>	
Romania	98.6		Romania	99.2
Bulgaria	93.6		Bulgaria	93.2
Greece	90.7		<u>Spain</u>	89.5
Portugal	90.1		<u>Portugal</u>	86.4
Spain	89.0		Czech	86.3
Czech	87.4		Slovakia	86.3
Slovakia	87.4	↓	<u>Greece</u>	85.3
Argentina	83.6		Argentina	83.1
Brazil	81.9		Ukraine	76.9
Ukraine	79.7		Brazil	76.2
Mexico	78.6		Mexico	73.7
Georgia	75.3		Georgia	71.0
Chile	65.9		Chile	66.8
Hungary	65.7		Russia	65.4
Russia	65.3		Hungary	63.2
Honduras	63.1		Honduras	58.2
Poland	59.3		Poland	56.5
Bolivia	59.0		Bolivia	50.5
Morocco	57.9		Morocco	49.6
Algeria	52.0		Slovenia	48.2
Turkey	50.9		Algeria	46.6
Slovenia	49.6		Belarus	45.2
Belarus	49.4		Turkey	40.8
Egypt	45.0		Guatemala	35.2
Peru	44.6		Egypt	33.1
Guatemala	43.3		Peru	30.8
Palestine	33.7		Palestine	30.2
Tunisia	25.9		Tunisia	17.8

- \*Only changes in the rank position greater than 2 are indicated with an arrow

- Underlined countries are those that change their position within their region

Concluding the discussion with regard to the LoA items, we find, first, that some are difficult to achieve in one region but easy in others – hence, the desirability of weighing them differently. Second, the ranking of regions in their success at liberalizing autocracy matches, by and large, both common sense and our initial theoretical expectations. However, third, some of the rankings of individual countries are surprising and serve to remind us that the data collection process is only at a preliminary stage.

## Mode of Transition<sup>2</sup>

In this analysis of MoT<sup>2</sup> we will follow in the steps we took in pursuit of the items in LoA<sup>2</sup> which is to say that we will first look at the region-specific frequencies of our eight MoT items. From this, we again will derive region specific weights (if needed). Then we will compare the countries' total MoT scores – both the simple and the time-corrected ones. And, finally, we will check whether the weighting of items according their regional difficulty changes the rank ordering on our MoT scales.

### ***Frequency of MoT items***

In Table 22, the reader will find displayed the eight MoT items ranked by the frequency with which they were attained in our 4 new (+ the 2 old) regional subsets.

**Table 22: The MoT items ranked by frequency (1974-1999/2000)**

SE			SA			CA			FSR			CEE			ME NA		
item	sum	weigh t	Item	sum	weigh t	Item	sum	Weigh ht	Item	Sum	weigh t	item	Sum	weigh t	item	Sum	weigh t
M6	77	1	M2	94.5	1	M5	62	1	M2	40.5	1	M2	69.5	1	M5	49.5	1
M7	77	1	M6	79	2	M2	53	2	M4	37	1	M3	66	2	M4	31.5	2
M8	77	1	M8	79	2	M1	52	2	M1	32	2	M1	64.5	2	M6	30	2
M2	75	2	M7	67	3	M3	42.5	3	M3	31.5	2	M4	61.5	3	M2	25	3
M3	75	2	M5	65	3	M6	39.5	3	M8	30.5	2	M1	61	3	M3	22	3
M5	74	2	M3	64	3	M4	31.5	4	M6	30	2	M5	51	4	M7	19	4
M4	67	3	M1	41	4	M7	30	4	M5	28.5	3	M7	50.5	4	M8	19	4
M1	25	4	M4	41	4	M8	30	4	M7	27.5	3	M8	45.5	4	M1	1	4
∅	68.5		∅	66.5		∅	42.5		∅	32		∅	58.7		∅	24.6	
Max*	16		Max*	22		Max*	23		Max*	16		Max*	23		Max*	23	

\*Maximum weighted score that can be achieved per country and year in the respective region

The first and most striking finding is that each region displays an almost completely different rank ordering of items. Among the LoA items, we did find some strong resemblances between selected regions, but not here. None of the MoT items has the same relative difficulty across the six regions. Moreover, some items, such as M7 (degree of fairness of the founding elections) and D8 (acceptance of the results of the founding elections), were the easiest to attain in one region (SE) and the most difficult in others (CA, and CEE). The only item that comes close to having had the same degree of difficulty across all regions was M2 (open and acknowledged conflicts within the administrative apparatus of the state over public policies). This the easiest MoT trait to achieve in SA and FSR (and, as we have already seen, in CEE). It belongs among the easiest items in SE and CA.

In SE, by far the most difficult item to accomplish was M1 (opposition movements enter into negotiations with the autocratic regime). This is due to the fact that during neither the Greek nor the Portuguese transitions did such negotiations take place. In Spain, not only did they take place, they made this country into the archetype of a *transición pactada*. In SA, the most difficult traits to attain were M1 and M4 (constitutional changes eliminating the role of non-accountable powers and veto groups). This is not surprising since that regional subset includes some of the most prominent cases of persistent “authoritarian enclaves,” i.e. special arrangements whereby out-going military rulers sought to secure their institutional privileges and political influence beyond their exit from executive office and well into the subsequent democratic regime. First and foremost, this applies to Chile but also to Peru, an interesting, if less visible, example of formalizing the role of non-accountable powers within a nascent democracy.

Getting rid of non-accountable veto groups was (and still is) difficult in CA as well. In addition, these countries display greater difficulty in holding founding elections under free and fair conditions (M7) and with widely accepted outcomes (M8). This has been **the** crucial issue during the long-lasting transition process in Mexico. It held national elections on a regular basis over several decades – none of which, however, qualified as free, fair and widely accepted. Only very recently was Mexico able to achieve these traits unequivocally. The easiest MoT item for the CA countries was the drafting and ratifying of a ‘democratic’ constitution (M5). This, in contrast, was one of the most difficult traits in the FSR. One reason for this seems to have been that most of these countries kept on using a modified version of the constitution of the former Soviet Republic without feeling the immediate necessity for designing a new one of their own. In other FSR cases, the new democratic forces decided to draft a new constitution but took an unusually long amount of time to get it ratified. For example, the Ukraine

started the drafting process already in 1991, but did not ratify its new constitution until five years later in 1996. They lost the opportunity to profit from a unique ‘constitutional moment,’ which might have helped the country to advance more rapidly on the course to regime consolidation.<sup>35</sup>

Due to these manifest differences, each item of MoT was given different weights within each of the 4+2 regions in Table 23 in an effort to make the aggregate scores more comparable. However, unlike the concepts of LoA and CoD, according to our theoretical understanding of MoT, it should not form a scale. Its items were not designed *a priori* to capture a single underlying dimension. The fact that each region displays such different patterns of difficulty is already a first indication of this non-scalability. Nevertheless, let us assume for a moment that the MoT items are scalable and compare the simple aggregative and the weighted indices.

### ***Comparing the Simple MoT<sup>2</sup> Scores***

Table 23 displays the sum of the simple, i.e. un-weighted, MoT scores per country and year. In the last rows of this table, we also have included the percentages that each country and region achieved on our time-corrected MoT indicator (t-c\_MoT). Let us, first, briefly scan the results of the unstandardized scores, i.e. those that are not corrected for the length of the MoT process, starting with an intra-regional comparison.

In Southern Europe, Spain ranks highest (182), slightly ahead of Greece (178) and further ahead Portugal (165). Spain was the only country in SE that achieved the maximum MoT score of 8 – and it did so already from the third year after its transition process started in 1976. As mentioned earlier, Greece and Portugal both ‘fail’ to accomplish item M1 (negotiations between old autocratic and new democratic forces). In Southern America, the rank order of countries is Argentina (129), Brazil (111), Peru (106.5), Chile (80.5), and Bolivia (65.5). All of them achieve some of the MoT traits by the 70s – except for Chile that enters the transition period that finally leads to the breakdown of the Pinochet regime and the installation of democracy in the late 80s. However, none of the SA countries, except for Brazil, achieves the maximum MoT score of 8. In Central America, Honduras (155.5) ranks highest, far above Guatemala (82) and Mexico (80). Among the former republics of the Soviet Union, Georgia (74) accumulated the highest aggregate MoT score, followed by the Ukraine (68), Russia (65.5) and, far behind, Belarus (25.5).

Table 23: Cumulative MoT scores

	SE			SA					CA			FSR				CE E						ME NA					
	Spain	Greece	Portugal	Argentina	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia	Peru	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	Ukraine	Russia	Georgia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Turkey	Algeria	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine	
1974	0	4	0	0	0	1	1	1	2.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1975	0	6.5	3	0	0	1	1	0.5	2.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1976	1	6.5	6	0	0	1	1	0.5	2.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1977	5	7	6	0.5	0	1	1	0.5	2.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1978	8	7	6	0	0	1	1	1.5	2.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1979	8	7	6	0.5	0	1	1	2	2.5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
1980	8	7	6	0.5	0	1	1	4	2.5	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2.5	0	0	
1981	8	7	6	0.5	0	1	1	4	2.5	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2.5	0	0	
1982	8	7	7	1.5	0	1.5	0.5	4	2.5	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2.5	0	0	
1983	8	7	7	5.5	0	1.5	0.5	4	2.5	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	0	2.5	2.5	0	0	
1984	8	7	7	7.5	0	1.5	0.5	4	2.5	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2.5	2.5	0	0	
1985	8	7	7	7.5	1	1.5	3.5	4	2.5	4	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2.5	2.5	0	0	
1986	8	7	7	7.5	0.5	2	3.5	4	2.5	4	7.5	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2.5	3.5	0	0	
1987	8	7	7	7.5	1	2	3.5	4.5	2.5	4	7.5	0	2	0	0	0	0.5	1	0.5	0	3	0	2.5	3.5	0	0	
1988	8	7	7	7.5	1	5	3.5	4.5	3	4	7.5	0	2	0	0	0.5	0.5	1.5	1	0	3	0	2.5	3.5	0	0	
1989	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	3.5	4.5	3	5	8	1	2	1	0	1.5	3	4.5	5	0.5	3	3	2.5	3.5	0	0	
1990	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	3.5	4.5	3	5	8	2.5	2	6	2	6	7	8	6.5	3.5	7	3	3	2.5	3.5	0	0
1991	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	3.5	4.5	3	5	8	6.5	2.5	6	2	7.5	7	8	6.5	4.5	7	3	3	2.5	3.5	0	0
1992	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	3.5	4.5	3	5	8	7	2.5	7	2	7.5	8	8	6.5	6	8	3	0	2.5	4	0	0
1993	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	3.5	6.5	3	4	8	7	7.5	7	2	7.5	8	8	6.5	6	8	3	0	2.5	4	0	0
1994	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	4.5	6.5	3	5	8	7	7.5	7	6.5	7.5	8	8	6.5	6	8	3	0	2.5	4	1	0
1995	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	4	6.5	3	5	8	7	7.5	8	3	7.5	8	8	6.5	6	8	3	0	2.5	4	0	0
1996	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	4	6.5	3	8	8	7.5	7	8	2	7.5	8	8	6.5	6	8	3	2	2.5	5.5	2.5	0
1997	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	4	6.5	6	8	8	7.5	7	8	2	7.5	8	8	7	6	8	3	2.5	2.5	5.5	1	0
1998	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	4	6.5	6	8	8	7.5	7	8	2	7.5	8	8	7	6	8	3	2	2.5	6	1	0
1999	8	7	7	7.5	7	8	4	6.5	6	8	8	7.5	7	8	2	7.5	8	8	7	6	8	3	2	2.5	6	1	0
74-99	182	178	165	129	80.5	111	65.5	106.5	80	82	155.5	68	65.5	74	25.5	75.5	82	90.5	73	56.5	82	49.5	17.5	48.5	75	6.5	0
Øreg	175			98.5					106			58.5				76.5						39.5					0
t-c %	94.8	85.6	82.5	70.1	67.5	53.4	31.5	51.3	38.4	68.3	84.5	77.3	58.5	84.1	31.9	78.6	78.9	56.6	70.3	64.3	78.9	36.4	19.9	30.3	46.9	13.5	0
reg%	87.6			54.1					63.6			63				71.3						29.4					0



If we compare the regional means in Table 23, we find no surprising results. SE (175) ranks first, far ahead of CA (106) and SA (98.5), followed by CEE (76.5) and the FSR (58.5). As expected, the last place is occupied by MENA (39.5). However, as mentioned before, our data set gives a bonus to those countries that started to change regimes early. In the case of the MoT, this time-bias is particularly evident: Once the transition period in a country is over, the coding rule is that the MoT scores attained at the end of the transition remain unchanged throughout the following years.<sup>36</sup> Hence, a standardization of the MoT scores that corrects for the amount of years that it took a country to go through the transition period, is badly needed.<sup>37</sup>

If we look at the time-corrected scores (the last two rows in Table 23), changes of country ranks occur within each region. In SA, Chile (67.5%), now ranks second highest (instead of second lowest). Apart from this, correcting for the time bias, leads to the result that the differences between countries from the same region become more clearly evident. See, for instance, the time corrected percentage for Mexico (38.4%), which now scores lower than Guatemala (68.3), although both countries received virtually the same time-uncorrected scores (80 and 82, respectively).

Comparing the regional mean scores, reveals some changes in the rank order. Still, the leading region is SE (87.6%). However, this time it is followed by CEE (71.3%). In the third position, we find CA (63.6%) and FSR (63%). SA (54.1%) only ranks fifth by this calculation. This is because, first, most South American countries spent many years in getting from autocracy to democracy – mostly due to the politically and physically powerful military willing to intervene frequently in the political process – and, second, hardly any of them reached the maximum MoT score.

In the following, we shall see whether the weighting of items according to their regional degree of difficulty leads to any changes in rank – both within and across the regions.

### ***Comparing Weighted with Simple MoT<sup>2</sup> Scores***

Table 24 displays the percentage scores that each country receives for our time-corrected MoT items, both the simple and the weighted ones. Again, the underlined names indicate that these countries changed the rank within their region and the arrows indicate the direction of change of a country's inter-regional rank if greater than two positions.

First, as was the case with the LoA items, the weighting procedure does not lead to major changes in rankings inside each region. Only Peru and Brazil switch their positions when using the weighted instead of the simple cumulative scores. Furthermore, even if we compare across four regions, there are few significant shifts in the country rankings due to the t-c\_MoT(w) items. However, two SE countries which ranked high on the unweighted MoT index were dramatically lowered when each of the items were weighted for difficulty. Portugal dropped from 5<sup>th</sup> to 10<sup>th</sup> overall.; Greece went from 2<sup>nd</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup>.

**Table 17: Country ranking on simple and weighted MoT scales, based on time-corrected scores (1974-1999)**

	<b>t-c_MoT</b>	Rank change*	<b>t-c_MoT(w)</b>
	<b>%</b>		<b>%</b>
Spain	94.8	Spain	95.1
Greece	85.6	Honduras	84.1
Honduras	84.5	Georgia	80.6

<sup>36</sup> For instance, if a country managed to liberalize its autocracy and to install democracy without any pacting, i.e. negotiation between autocratic rulers and democratic opposition forces (item M1), it will never be able to achieve the highest MoT score possible.

<sup>37</sup> Obviously, an even better way of dealing with the measurement problem of MoT would be to limit the MoT scoring to a country-specific period of time during which MoT scores can be accumulated; before and after this period, all MoT scores are set to 0. Notice that such a way of making the MoT scores more comparable requires an agreement on when the transition period – understood in the terms outlined in this paper – lasted in every single country.

Georgia	84.1		Slovenia	78.3
Portugal	82.5		Czech	76.3
Slovenia	81.8		Slovakia	76.3
Czech	78.9		Bulgaria	75.2
Slovakia	78.9		Ukraine	74.7
Bulgaria	78.6	↓	Greece	72.6
Ukraine	77.3	↓	Portugal	68.3
Poland	70.3		Argentina	67.4
Argentina	70.1		Guatemala	65.2
Chile	67.5		Poland	64.2
Guatemala	68.3		Romania	63.3
Romania	64.3		Chile	61.5
Russia	58.5		Russia	56.0
Hungary	56.6		Hungary	54.5
Brazil	53.4		<u>Peru</u>	52.2
Peru	51.3		<u>Brazil</u>	50.2
Morocco	46.9		Morocco	42.6
Mexico	38.4		Turkey	38.3
Turkey	36.4		Belarus	28.4
Belarus	31.9		Mexico	24.9
Bolivia	31.5		Bolivia	24.0
Egypt	30.3		Egypt	21.9
Algeria	19.9		Algeria	13.0
Palestine	13.5		Palestine	10.1
Tunisia	2.1		Tunisia	2.2

- \*Only changes in the rank position greater than 2 are indicated with an arrow
- Underlined countries are those that change their position within their region

The countries at the bottom of both scales should not surprise us much: Egypt, Palestine, and Tunisia. At the top, we would have anticipated most of those that actually made it there. However, there are many ‘strange’ rankings. Why, for instance, do Honduras and Georgia score so high? Why do Mexico and Bolivia come out so low? This raises serious doubts about whether we should really compress the eight MoT items into a uni-dimensional score. Not only do these empirical anomalies give us pause, but the theoretical assumptions about the nature of “modes of transition” has also suggested that this may not be wise.

*Insomma*, the MoT data seem to capture crucial differences in transition processes within and across world regions. For instance, they allow us to detect which countries have had a negotiated transition and how long it took them to “transit” from autocracy to democracy. However, we remain skeptical whether these differences can be captured with a single uni-dimensional indicator. Later, we will statistically check for the reliability of such a MoT scale.

## **Consolidation of Democracy<sup>2</sup>**

In order to analyze our data on the consolidation of democracy (CoD) we will follow the same format. We start by looking at the region-specific frequencies of the twelve items. From this, we derive the weighting schemes for each subset. This will be followed by a comparison of the countries’ CoD scores – both the simple and the time-corrected (t-c\_CoD) ones. And, finally, we will discover whether this weighting procedure leads to significant differences in rank orders..

### ***Frequency of CoD<sup>2</sup> Items***

An initial glance at the relative difficulties revealed by our CoD items across our 4 (+2) regions displayed in Table 25 provides us with the following, highly significant and anticipated, observation: the



12 measurement of CoD traits display almost exactly the same pattern of difficulty in all 6 world regions – a strong confirmation both of our theoretical assumption and its operationalization. This resembles what we have already found in examining the LoA data, but is quite different from the associations we found in the MoT dataset. Look, for instance, at the bottom of each of the frequency ratings. Among the three last items, we find - without any exception – the items C5 (electoral volatility has diminished significantly) and C8 (second rotation in power). To this, we could add item C1 (no significant political party advocates changes in the existing constitution), with the notable exception of Central America, where this item belongs among the easiest ones to achieve. A glance at the top quarter of the frequency rankings reveals that item C9 (agreement on association formation and behavior) belongs to the easiest items to attain in all four regions.<sup>38</sup>

**Table 25: The CoD items ranked by frequency (1974-1999/2000)**

SE			SA			CA			FSR			CEE			ME NA		
item	sum	weigh t	Item	sum	weigh t	Item	sum	weigh t	Item	sum	weigh t	item	sum	weig ht	item	sum	weig ht
C2	75	1	C2	75	1	C9	62	1	C2	24.5	1	C2	60	1	C9	26.5	1
C3	75	1	C9	72.5	1	C1	55	1	C3	22.5	1	C6	58.5	1	C11	21.5	2
C4	72.5	1	C10	70.5	1	C10	55	1	C9	21	1	C9	58.5	1	C10	20	2
C9	68.5	2	C3	58.5	2	C6	44	2	C12	16	2	C3	58	1	C2	19.5	2
C10	67	2	C11	52.5	2	C2	43	2	C4	14.5	2	C4	55	2	C4	19.5	2
C11	63	2	C7	48	3	C12	38.5	2	C11	14	2	C10	53	2	C3	16.5	2
C12	63	2	C12	47	3	C11	32.5	3	C7	13	2	C12	37.5	3	C7	12	3
C6	58	3	C4	46	3	C3	31.5	3	C6	12	2	C11	36	3	C6	11.5	3
C7	55	3	C6	38	3	C4	31.5	3	C10	9.5	3	C7	33	3	C12	9.5	3
C5	47.5	3	C1	35	3	C7	28	3	C8	3	4	C1	27.5	3	C1	8.5	3
C1	47	3	C8	24	4	C5	21	4	C1	1.5	4	C5	16	4	C8	7	3
C8	22	4	C5	11	4	C8	17	4	C5	1.5	4	C8	16	4	C5	0	3
∅	59.5		∅	48		∅	38.5		∅	13		∅	42.43		∅	14.3	
Max*		27	Max		30	Max		29	Max		28	Max		28	Max		29

\*Maximum weighted score that can be achieved per country and year in the respective region

Let us briefly have a closer look at each region's ranking.. In Southern Europe, no problems at all exist in fulfilling the basic standards of the democratic electoral procedure: regular elections are held, their outcomes are widely respected (C2), the elections are free and fair (C3) and no parties or groups reject the previous electoral outcomes (C4). In addition to this, Spain Greece and Portugal perform relatively well in reaching agreements on the four major partial regimes, i.e. on the formation and behavior of associations (C9), on the executive format (C10), on the territorial division of competencies (C11), and on the rules of ownership and access to the media (C12).

In contrast, South America, and even more so Central America, have considerable difficulty in attaining and sustaining even such fundamental features of a minimal definition of an electoral democracy as: the holding of elections that are free and fair (C3); and the results of which are widely respected (C4). Especially in CA, these basic electoral items rank astonishingly low, just above the first and second turn-over (items C7 and C8) and the electoral volatility indicator (C5).<sup>39</sup> The former republics of the Soviet Union seem to have less problems in completing items C2, C3, and C4. However, it is the only region in which the agreement on the executive format (C10), i.e. the question whether the democracy should be presidential, parliamentarian, or some kind of mixture, seems to be relatively difficult to achieve.

<sup>38</sup> Such a coherence in the item frequency makes us feel confident that our twelve CoD indicators measure the same underlying concept. Nevertheless, we will statistically test for this in due course.

<sup>39</sup> This bad performance of CA in the electoral component of democracy can only partly be explained by the impact of Mexico's decades long record of rigged elections.

Due to the similarities of the patterns of difficulty across the regions, the different weighting schemes resemble each other, even if none of them is exactly identical. Hence, we can expect to find few differences in the rankings when comparing the weighted and un-weighted scores. Before doing so, we should take a closer look at the un-weighted CoD scores only – both the un-standardized and the time-corrected ones.

### ***Comparing the Simple CoD<sup>2</sup> Scores***

Table 26 displays the sum total for the 12 CoD items for each country and year. In addition, the last two rows display the extent to which the countries and regions were able to complete our time-corrected CoD scale. Let us begin with a comparison of countries within the same region.

In Southern Europe, Greece (243) has the highest aggregate CoD score. The country accomplished its first complete traits already in 1974. However, it took Greece more than 20 years until it got the maximum CoD score of 12 (1996) and it only sustained that for one year.<sup>40</sup> Spain (226) ranks second in SE. Until now, it has never gotten the maximum score, although, since the mid-80s, it always comes close to it, consistently achieving a score higher than 10. The main reason why Spain does not fulfill all the CoD criteria is the fact that it fails to completely accomplish the items C1, C5, and C11. That is to say, there are significant political parties that advocate major constitutional changes, electoral volatility has risen during and after the national elections of 1996, and consensus on the territorial division of competencies has been difficult to maintain. Portugal, in contrast, achieved the CoD maximum score of 12 by the mid-90s, i.e. it took the country two decades to arrive at the endpoint of our (unweighted) CoD scale.

It is interesting, to look at the different speed with which our countries advanced in consolidating their democracies. There seems to be regional pattern of tempo. If we take SE – the region that is commonly seen as the most successful one in terms of consolidation – and compare it with CEE – the region for which many analysts predicted great difficulty (if not impossibility) in consolidating democracy due to their simultaneous economic, social and political challenges – we find something counter-intuitive in the data: Not only have the CEE countries achieved high CoD scores, but most of them did so in much less time than their SE counterparts. If we establish a benchmark at a score higher than 10, it took Spain 10, Greece 14 and Portugal 15 years to achieve this. For the CEE countries, the respective figures are much lower, sometimes less than the half: Bulgaria 6, the Czech Republic 9, Hungary 9, Poland 9, Romania 7, and Slovakia 9 years.

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<sup>40</sup> The reason for going back to 11.5 is a slight decline in item C11 (agreement on the territorial division of competencies) from 1997 onwards, the year in which the Greek government planned to transform municipalities into local administration areas, which created some discontent among certain minority groups.

Table 26: Cumulative CoD scores

	SE			SA					CA			FSR				CEE						ME NA				
	Spain	Greece	Portugal	Argentina	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia	Peru	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	Ukraine	Russia	Georgia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Turkey	Algeria	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine
1974	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	6.5	6	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	5.5	7	6	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	7	7.5	6	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	9	7.5	6	0	0	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	9	7.5	6.5	0	0	0	0	3.5	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	0
1981	8.5	8	6.5	0	0	0	0	3.5	5	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	0
1982	8.5	8.5	7.5	0	0	0	2.5	3.5	5	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.5	1	0
1983	9	8.5	7	3	0	0	2.5	3.5	5	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	0	0.5	1	0
1984	9	8.5	6.5	8.5	0	1	2.5	3.5	5	1	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.5	1.5	0	
1985	9.5	9.5	7.5	9	0	1	5.5	4.5	5	3	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.5	1.5	0	
1986	10.5	10	7.5	8.5	0	1	5.5	4.5	5	3	10	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.5	1.5	0	
1987	10.5	11	7.5	8	0	1	5.5	4.5	5	3	10	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.5	1.5	0	
1988	10.5	10.5	7.5	8	0	4	5.5	4.5	5	3	10	0	0.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0.5	1.5	0	
1989	10.5	11.5	8.5	8.5	4	8	5.5	4.5	5	3	11	0.5	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	4	3	0.5	1.5	0	
1990	10.5	11.5	10.5	8.5	6	9	5.5	5	5	4	11	0.5	1	0	0	5	6.5	6.5	5	3	7.5	4	3	0.5	2	0
1991	10.5	11.5	10.5	9	7	9	5.5	5	5	4	11	4.5	1	1.5	0.5	8	7.5	6.5	7.5	5.5	7.5	5	3	0.5	2	0
1992	10.5	11.5	11	9	7	9	5.5	4.5	5	4	11	6	1.5	3	0.5	7.5	8	6.5	8.5	7	7.5	5	2.5	0.5	2	0
1993	10.5	10.5	11	8.5	8	9.5	7.5	5	5	5	11	6	4.5	3	0.5	6	8	6.5	9	7	7.5	5	2.5	0.5	2	0
1994	11	10.5	11	10	8	11	7.5	5	6.5	6	11	7	4.5	3	1.5	8	8.5	9	9.5	7	7.5	5	3	0.5	2	2
1995	11	11	11	10	8	11	7.5	6	6.5	6	11	7.5	5.5	3	0	10	8.5	9	9	7	7.5	6	2.5	0.5	2	0.5
1996	11.5	12	12	9	8	11	7.5	6	7	10	11	8	5	3	0.5	10	9	10	9.5	10.5	8	6	3	0.5	2	3
1997	11.5	11.5	12	9.5	8	11	8.5	6	8	10	11	8	5	4	0.5	7.5	9	10	10	10.5	8	6	3.5	0.5	2	2
1998	11.5	11.5	12	9.5	8	11	8.5	6	8	10	11	8.5	5	4	0.5	10.5	10.5	11	11	10.5	10.5	6	3.5	0.5	4	2
1999	10.5	11.5	12	9.5	8	11	8.5	6	8	10	11	7	6	2.5	0.5	10.5	10	11	11	10.5	10.5	6	3.5	0.5	4	2
74-99	226	243	209.5	146	80	118.5	107	96.5	144	85	200	63.5	41.5	27	5	83	85.5	87	93	78.5	82	80.5	33	10	37	11.5
Øreg	226			110					143			34.5				85						34.5				
t-c %	81.8	77.9	72.7	71.2	60.6	61.8	49.5	38.3	46.2	44.3	83.3	48.1	24.7	25	4.7	69.2	71.3	65.9	70.4	65.4	68.3	39.5	25	4.2	15.4	16
reg%	77.5			56.3					57.9			25.6				68.4						20				

In South America, Argentina (146) accumulated the highest CoD score, followed by Brazil (118.5), Bolivia (107), Peru (95.5) and Chile (80). This rank order – especially the low ranking for Chile, far behind such crisis-ridden democracies as Peru and Bolivia – seems to be at odds with common sense and, therefore, we expect significant changes once we correct the scores for their time bias. However, let us not forget that Chile is still struggling to resolve several core issues in the consolidation of its democratic institutions. First and foremost, there is a lack of consensus among key political actors on the existing constitution. In addition, Chile is still waiting for experiencing a first (and, of course, second) turn-over in power. To all this should be grafted the constraints imposed on elected representatives by non-elected veto groups, mainly, the military. All of these features form part of our CoD measurement device and they are commonly referred to as key issues in the literature as well. Hence, there are good reasons for the lower ranking of Chile – even if some of the poor score can be explained by its having started later than its regional brethren.

In Central America, Honduras (200) is leading in consolidation, followed by Mexico (144) and Guatemala (85). None of these countries has ever achieved the maximum score of 12 at any point in period since 1974.<sup>41</sup> Among the republics of the former Soviet Union, Belarus (5) ranks by far the lowest on our CoD scale. In contrast, the Ukraine (63.5) and Russia (41.5) perform relatively well in this region; whereas, Georgia (27) comes out in the middle.

Ranking the four world regions by their simple cumulative scores reveals that SE (226) has accumulated the most CoD traits over the last three decades, followed by CA (143) and SA (110). CEE (85) ranks fourth. At the end of the scale, we find FSR and MENA, both with a sum of 34.5. Let us ‘standardize’ the simple sum of scores as we did before, by dividing it by the number of years since each country accomplished its first CoD trait. This should improve our ability to compare across regions.<sup>42</sup>

Within each region, our standard correction for time-dependence only leads to a few changes in the country rankings, especially in those regions in which the countries started their process of consolidation at very different points in time. One such change occurs in SE, where Spain (81.9%) now ranks first, followed by Greece (77.9%) and Portugal (72.7%).

More significant alteration in the country rankings can be found in SA. As expected, Chile (60.6%) moves up, overtaking Peru (38.3%) and Bolivia (49.5%). It now ranks third in our SA sample, closely behind Brazil (61.8%) and Argentina (71.2%). In contrast, in CA, no changes in the CoD rankings emerge. However, the time-corrected scores of Mexico (46.2%) and Guatemala (44.3%) are much closer than were their simple cumulative scores. Honduras (83.3%) is still suspiciously far ahead, which suggests possible measurement error for a polity about which very little is known in academic circles. In FSR, the Ukraine (48.1%) still ranks highest and Belarus (4.7%) lowest; whereas, Georgia (25%) and Russia (24.7%) have switched their positions – by only a small margin.

The ranking of regions based on their time-corrected scores releases some interesting, but not surprising, findings. SE (77.5%) is still the most consolidated region by a considerable margin. However, the CEE countries have caught up significantly and they now rank second (68.4%) on our t-c\_CoD scale). This is another reflection of the indisputable fact that, contrary to the expectations of area specialists, post-communist Eastern Europeans advanced relatively quickly in consolidating their democracies. In third and fourth position come the two Latin American subgroups: CA (57.9%) and SA (56.3%). At the tailend of the t-c CoD scale, as expected, we find FSR (25.6%) and MENA (20%).

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<sup>41</sup> The score of Honduras is so counter-intuitively high in relation to the other CA countries – but also in relation to all other countries in our sample that we suspect this to be the result of a coding error. This is even more likely since Honduras belongs to those of our 17 countries, which have only been coded by one person and, hence, the data at our hand is only a preliminary version.

<sup>42</sup> For the CoD scores, there is another, more subtle way of standardizing the scores. Instead of using calendar time, one could introduce an analytical timeframe by looking at each country’s scores over the period of, let’s say, twelve years after the founding elections were held.

Again, most of our descriptive observations concerning the extent of regime consolidation in specific countries and regions violate neither common sense nor theoretical projections. Some scores for individual countries do deviate sufficiently from expectations that they call into question the quality of the data, but not the basic rationale for gathering it. Now, in order to make the results even more comparable across different regions, let us apply the weighting schemes developed and check whether this leads to any changes in the ranking of countries.

### ***Comparing Weighted with Simple CoD<sup>2</sup> Scores***

Table 27 displays the percentages each country achieves on the sum of both the simple and the weighted CoD items. Again, the underlined names indicate that these countries changed rank within their region and the arrows indicate the direction of a significant change in a country's inter-regional rank. These are among the most revealing results from the three measurement efforts.

First, let us take a look at the overall frequency distribution for the two CoD indices. The range of possible values in both cases runs from 0% to 100%, although the maximum is purely theoretical since it could only be achieved in the course of an 'instant consolidation', i.e. a country that met all our twelve CoD items within the first year of its regime change. This is impossible because some of our items require the passing of a certain amount of time, or better, the holding of more than one election, e.g. items C7 and C8 (first and second turn-over). The same is true for the electoral volatility item (C5). Nevertheless, one nice property of the CoD indices is that those countries that are able to keep fulfilling our criteria over a long time period, manage to asymptotically approach the theoretical endpoint and thereby acquire a consolidated democratic regime. Hence, we do confirm one of the well-established assumptions in the literature – namely that the sheer 'longevity' of a democracy contributes to the extent of its consolidation.<sup>43</sup>

Our 17 new cases are spread across almost the full (possible) range of measurement, i.e., the respective figures for CoD vary from almost 0% to *ca.* 85%. And, furthermore, they do so in a fairly even manner.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, some clusters can be identified and they are identical on both the simple and the weighted indices of CoD. In the highest quintile, we find the suspicious case of Honduras, but also the anticipated ones of Spain, Slovenia and Greece. The next quintile is lead by Portugal and it also contains three of the SA neo-democracies: Argentina, Brazil and Chile, plus the other neo-democracies from CEE. The third quintile at the middle seems to be a sort of "catchment basin" for varied experiences with regime change. In it, we find those countries that perform either worse (Bolivia and Peru, in the case of SA; Mexico and Guatemala for CA), or better (Turkey, in the case of MENA; Ukraine for the FSR) than their regional neighbors. In the last two quintiles, at the bottom of both CoD scales, we exclusively find countries from the FSR and MENA.

If we look closer at the ranking of individual countries, we see that almost no **intra**-regional changes occur when we correct for time-dependence and the degree of difficulty. Only in CEE, do the Czech Republic and Poland change their positions. The latter becomes the most consolidated democracy in that region based on the weighted CoD index. By and large, this lack of intra-regional changes in rank demonstrates that not a single country in our 4+2 world regions takes an exceptionally region-specific road towards consolidating its democracy. Instead, they all seem to follow a similar basic sequence when compared with their neighbors..

Moreover, hardly any major changes occur in the **inter**-regional rankings – with three exceptions: Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey. Brazil moves up three positions and now ranks 10<sup>th</sup> in the entire sample. Mainly, this is caused by Brazil's having achieved a second turn-over in power (item C8).

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<sup>43</sup> Put differently, it makes a difference whether a country has accomplished many CoD traits over the last 3 or the last 13 years and we are able to display these differences with the way we construct our CoD indices.

<sup>44</sup> This finding of a 'normal distribution' might be very helpful once we use this data as the dependent variables in regression analysis.

Since this is accomplished by only a few countries and since item C8 was weighted by a factor of 4, this explains its steep rise in score after 1994 onwards. (See Appendix 3 for the weighted CoD scores per country and year).

Mexico, in contrast, moves down three ranks once we take into account the relative difficulty of specific items in CoD. Not only does it rank below all other countries from SE, SA and CEE, but it even achieves a lower percentage on the t-c\_CoD(w) scores (30.8%) than Turkey (39.7%) and the Ukraine (35.7%)<sup>45</sup>. NB that a low ranking here reflects the combination of three factors: (1) the country may not fulfill many of the items; (2) it may have taken a relatively long time to get where it is; and (3) it may have only accomplished the relatively easy tasks. Mexico combines all of these three and, thus, ranks especially low on the t-c\_CoD(w) index. Nevertheless, Mexico has shown a clear trend towards consolidation in the last few years, mainly by holding free and fair elections (C3) that brought an end to the PRI dominance which lasted for more than half a century. And, most importantly, the electoral conditions and its outcome have been accepted by all major political parties (C4), including the losing ones. In short, just because it dropped several ranks does not imply that Mexico is failing to move toward consolidation or is in danger of regressing to autocracy.

**Table 27: Country ranking on simple and weighted CoD scales, based on time-corrected scores (1974-1999)**

	<b>CoD</b>	Rank	<b>CoD(w)</b>
	<b>%</b>	changes*	<b>%</b>
Honduras	83.3		Honduras 82.4
Spain	81.8		Spain 74.7
Slovenia	81.7		Slovenia 74.1
Greece	77.9		Greece 71.8
Portugal	72.7		Portugal 63.3
Czech	71.3		Argentina 61.0
Argentina	71.2		<u>Poland</u> 60.9
Poland	70.4		<u>Czech</u> 58.9
Bulgaria	69.2		Bulgaria 58.8
Slovakia	68.3		Brazil 57.0
Hungary	65.9	↑ Slovakia	55.7
Romania	65.4		Hungary 53.4
Brazil	61.8		Romania 51.3
Chile	60.6		Chile 46.1
Bolivia	49.5		<i>Sample mean</i> <b>41.8</b>
<i>Sample mean</i>	<b>49.4</b>	↑ Turkey	39.7
Ukraine	48.1		Bolivia 37.0
Mexico	46.2		Guatemala 36.2
Guatemala	44.3		Ukraine 35.7
Turkey	39.5		Peru 34.4
Peru	38.3		Mexico 30.8
Georgia	25.0		Russia 18.1
Algeria	25.0		Algeria 17.9
Russia	24.7		Georgia 15.7
Palestine	16.0		Palestine 13.8
Morocco	15.4		Morocco 12.2
Belarus	4.7		Egypt 5.2
Egypt	4.2		Belarus 3.4
Tunisia	1.0		Tunisia 0.4

- \*Only changes in the rank position greater than 2 are indicated with an arrow
- Underlined countries are those that change their position within their region

<sup>45</sup> Notice, however, the relatively large difference between Mexico (30.8%) and the country on the next lower rank, Russia (18.1%).

Another country worth mentioning is Slovenia.<sup>46</sup> This country ranks high on both CoD scales in Table 27. If we concede that Honduras' position is, at least partly, caused by coding errors, then it is one of the most successful cases in our entire sample. It fulfills 74,1% of our t-c\_CoD(w) index. Only Spain ranks slightly higher (74.7%), but the already mature 'young' democracies Greece (71.8%) and Portugal (63.3%) follow at a notable distance. This rank may only be surprising to those who confuse the country with Slovakia or have never pay much attention to it. In fact, one of the main reasons most people know so little about this small country is that there is not much to call it to the public's attention. Its politics have quickly become so predictable and quiet – in the midst of the other former republics of Yugoslavia that have been anything but predictable and quiet – that one forgets those dire predictions about the fate of “post-communist” regimes.

Summing up the findings based on the CoD data, both the overall ranking of individual countries and the ranking of regions do not contradict expectations based on the common sense or previous observations in the scholarly literature. This, however, does not imply that we should stop here and not go beyond such an eye-balled (“inter-ocular”) validation of the data. NB, however, that this requires something different from calculating the correlation between our indices and large N measurements contained in Freedom House Index or the Polity data set, the most common way in the democracy measurement business of testing for the validity of one's own data. Why is this? Why is correlation no appropriate approach for testing the validity of our index?

Some of the most important arguments are nicely summarized in Munck/Verkuilen (2002). Where they observe that high correlations between the existing large N indicators may only mean that their producers are using the same biased sources for scoring these variables.<sup>47</sup> Also, when the highly correlated indicators come from highly aggregated variables and when no dimensionality analyses have been performed, they may be masking very big divergences in the sub-processes that compose them. In other words, in studying democratization comparatively, highly significant correlation should not be accepted as proof of either the reliability of the data or of the correct operationalization of the concept.

These two arguments against “correlational validation” do not fully apply in our case. First, we explicitly encouraged our coders to use whatever sources they thought was appropriate. Consequently, none of them relied exclusively on such commonly used sources of information as Keesing's World Archive, Banks, etc. Second, unlike most large N democracy indices, we have chosen to gather and report on detailed sub-processes and events and will explicitly test in the following section whether our data clusters into a uni-dimensional space and, thus, can be safely aggregated into a single index. So why not using correlation as a means of cross-checking our findings?

The problem is situated, first and foremost, at the conceptual rather than on the empirical level. More precisely, our intention has been to measure the degree of consolidation of whatever type of democracy; whereas, the purpose of the Freedom House Index, the Polity data and other indices has been is to display the extent to which the polity being observed conforms to a particular type of liberal democracy.<sup>48</sup> We would not be embarrassed by a high correlation between our various scales and, say, the Freedom House Index, but such a “finding” would not give us much encouragement – given the differences in intent.

An alternative way of assessing the quality of our scales would be to check their external validity, i.e. to test whether existing hypotheses on the causes for and consequences of consolidation of

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<sup>46</sup> Slovenia belongs to the CEE subgroup and, thus, should have been included in the previous chapters in which we compared the CEE democracies with the MENA countries. However, the data on Slovenia has been generated just recently and it is therefore only taken into consideration when we compare the simple with the weighted CoD (LoA, MoI) scores.

<sup>47</sup> For the same argument, see (Foweraker/Krznicaric 2001: 5f).

<sup>48</sup> Although we have to concede that, despite this important conceptual difference, some overlap of the indicators used exists, nonetheless, the disparity in the items used prevails.

democracy are confirmed by our data on CoD.<sup>49</sup> At the present state of our project, we are not yet able to perform such an external validity test but we will do so in due time. Fortunately, most of the other means for assuring validity mentioned by Munck/Verkuilen (2002) are met by our data (multiple indicators, cross-system equivalence, medium range of numbers of categories within one indicator).

Instead of asking whether our data-set correlates with already existing ones, we will conclude by dealing with a more fundamental issue: whether the items we have specified and coded in our attempt to measure LoA, CoD (and, perhaps, MoT) do, indeed, produce a uni-dimensional scale, as we have been presuming in the previous sections and as we have discovered in the case of CEE and MENA.

## **The Crucial Test(s) for Scalability<sup>2</sup>**

The dimensionality of theoretical concepts and empirical data is a persistent issue in empirical social science in general, and in the measurement of democracy, in particular.<sup>50</sup> As always, aggregating different operational indicators to a 'bounded whole' risks committing a 'reification error'. This consists in putting together mathematically items that do not belong together empirically (Collier/Adcock 1999: 544). By doing so, countries with an identical cumulative score can be completely different in their individual scores. Or, as Michael Coppedge puts it: "The worst tactic for coping with multidimensionality is to assume blindly that all the components are unidimensional and barrel on, adding or averaging these apples and oranges" (Coppedge 2002: 37).

As mentioned *supra*, one statistical technique for testing whether data are uni-dimensional is reliability analysis.<sup>51</sup> The statistical test for this is Cronbach's alpha and it varies from 0 to 1.<sup>52</sup> The higher the value, the closer the data comes to being one-dimensional. In general, a value above .7 is considered sufficient to validate the assumption of uni-dimensionality in the data (Santos 1999). If the data meet this test, they can be reliably aggregated into a single scalar indicator without fear of committing the reification error.

We have already discovered that each of the data-sets for LoA, MoT and CoD for the CEE and MENA countries do form a one-dimensional scale. Even more surprising, when analyzed together, they reproduce a single scale measuring the democratization process as a whole! Here, our main purpose now is to see whether this finding of uni-dimensionality holds up with the new data from SE, SA, CA and FSR.

In Table 28, we have displayed the results of various reliability tests. Concerning the LoA, MoT and CoD items measured over the time period 1974-1999, all values for Cronbach's alpha easily exceed the 0.7 benchmark. This critical test for uni-dimensionality is also satisfied when we combine the data on all of the items in LoA and CoD. No differences in reliability were found between the simple aggregated and the weighted scores. Moreover, this even holds up when we split our data into each of the six sub-regions. These results can be taken as a first (and strong) hint that our data not only measures a single underlying dimension for each of our three concepts of regime change, but they also reveal uni-dimensionality when LoA and CoD are combined into a single scale.

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<sup>49</sup> For a paradigmatic example of checking the external validity of different measure of democracy, see Elkins (2000).

<sup>50</sup> For a recent debate not only on this critical issue, see Munck/Verkuilen (2002) and the responses it triggered in *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 35, no. 1 (2002).

<sup>51</sup> For a good overview of the different one-dimensional scaling techniques, see (McIver/Carmines 1981) and (Pennings/Keman/Kleinnijenhuis 1999).

<sup>52</sup> Nichols (1999) points to the fact that although the theoretical range of alpha is 0-1, in practice - under certain conditions - there can be negative alpha values.



**Table 28: Cronbach's alpha (base: all years)**

	<b>LoA</b>	<b>LoA (w)</b>	<b>CoD</b>	<b>CoD (w)</b>	<b>LoA+Co D</b>	<b>LoA+Co D(w)</b>	<b>MoT</b>	<b>MoT (w)</b>
<b>All countries</b> (N=745)	.9471	.8969	.9514	.9247	.9691	.9484	.9481	.9270
<b>Southern Europe</b> (N=81)	.8593	.7502	.9005	.8417	.9345	.8831	.8661	.6497
<b>South America</b> (N=135)	.9392	.8933	.9183	.8581	.9529	.9235	.9156	.9000
<b>Central America</b> (N=81)	.8027	.7493	.9027	.8841	.9230	.8997	.9042	.8921
<b>CEE</b> (N=183)	.9889	.9435	.9711	.9472	.9853	.9681	.9827	.9673
<b>FSR</b> (N=109)	.9570	.9411	.9204	.9148	.9559	.9480	.9636	.9459
<b>MENA</b> (N=157)	.8576	.8809	.8567	.8461	.9011	.8995	.8313	.8520

However, these impressive results can be rejected by pointing out that we based our analysis on time-series data, i.e. that the different data points for one and the same variable, measured in different years, are not independent from each other and, consequently, are very likely to correlate highly with each other. Seen from this perspective, the highly significant values for Cronbach's alpha would be a mere artifact of auto-correlation in the data. In order to control for this, we re-calculated Cronbach's alpha at different points in time. The results are displayed in Table . As one can see, all values are higher than 0.7. And, again, weighting the items does not change the uni-dimensionality of the indicators<sup>53</sup>.

**Table 29: Cronbach's alpha (base: different points in time)**

	<b>LoA</b>	<b>LoA(w)</b>	<b>CoD</b>	<b>CoD(w)</b>	<b>LoA+Co D</b>	<b>LoA+Co D (w)</b>	<b>MoT</b>	<b>MoT(w)</b>
<b>All countries</b> (N=28)								
<b>1976</b>	.9295	.8966	.8991	.8947	.9543	.9395	.8957	.8371
<b>1980</b>	.9320	.8995	.9133	.8817	.9566	.9396	.9260	.8992
<b>1985</b>	.9409	.9092	.9440	.9246	.9651	.9497	.9345	.9039
<b>1990</b>	.8286	.6944	.8651	.8885	.9248	.8875	.8389	.8398
<b>1995</b>	.8547	.7180	.8669	.8506	.9332	.8817	.9165	.8750
<b>1999</b>	.8623	.7066	.9318	.8672	.9471	.8910	.9146	.8639

As can be observed in Table, the LoA scale and the CoD scale each measures points within a single spatial dimension. And, even if we put the two together, the uni-dimensionality still holds up. This provides us with the opportunity of building an overall democratization scale that can be reliably applied across a wide range of world regions. based on the LoA and the CoD items (the raw data of the combined LoA+CoD scales can be found in Appendix 1).

NB that we have not included the 8 items from MoT in this macro-scale, even though the MoT data also generates highly significant values for Cronbach's alpha. We regard this as surprising (and suspicious) because – as we have mentioned several times – the modes of transition are theoretically “nominal” in nature and should not be scalable. So, why do these items scale so embarrassing well? Our hunch is that this is a methodological artifact and not a substantial finding. Put more precisely, the high Cronbach's alpha seems to be caused by the coding rules. One peculiar characteristic of the MoT items - unlike the LoA and CoD ones – is that their scores cannot change after they have reached the

<sup>53</sup> Unfortunately, we cannot perform the same reliability analyses for each region separately. The combination of a relatively low N (3 to 7) and many items to scale (7 to 15), plus the different democratization-timings and tempos of our countries, renders the results of such an analysis, by and large, meaningless.

maximum of 1. Once a country has held its founding elections (D6) that were free and fair (D7) and widely respected (D8), the country keeps on receiving the score 1 on these items for the rest of the time. The same is true for all of the other MoT items once the transition is over, i.e. once the country has managed to ‘transit’ from autocracy to democracy. Liberalization and consolidation processes can and do move backwards when their properties change and this is monitored by subsequent scores of 0.5 or 0.0.

\* \* \*

These (still preliminary) results from the reliability/scalability analysis strongly imply that we were right in initially assuming uni-dimensionality among the LoA and CoD items. We are convinced that when ranking countries and regions according to their acquisition of these items over time, we are indeed measuring progress and regress in the key dimensions of a singular process of regime change. Putting them together, we seem to have discovered (a bit to our surprise) a unique, continuous and consistent process of institutional change and acquisition of “system properties” that could be called “democratization.” In the case of MoT, we are more cautious about committing the fallacy of reification. The reliability/scalability analysis does not reject the possibility of its items forming a single dimension, but we continue to believe that this is more due to specific features of the measurement instrument than to reality. Therefore, we choose to leave the MoT data in a disaggregate state or to combine its information in nominal types rather than a single continuous scale. And this means that the mode of transition should not be treated operationally as part of either the process of consolidation or the more generic one of democratization. Which is not to say that we exclude the possibility, even the probability, that it makes a difference in the outcome of regime change, just that it should not be defined as such. Different modes may have different effects, but different modes may also have the same effect. Which is another way of saying that there is likely to be more than one way to democratize successfully, and that it makes better sense to begin with this notion of equifinality and subsequently test for it – rather than preclude it by wrapping up the entire process of democratization in a single index or scale. Just as we have self-consciously not presumed in the selection of our indicators that one or another type of democracy – presidential or parliamentary, unitary or federal, majoritarian or consensual, judicially or politically accountable – would be preferable in all circumstances, so have we not “reified” the contribution of any particular mode of transition.

## Conclusions

None ... yet

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## Appendix 1: Weighted Compound scores LoA (1974-99)

	SE			SA					CA			FSR				CEE						ME NA				
	Spain	Greece	Portugal	Argentina	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia	Peru	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	Ukraine	Russia	Georgia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Turkey	Algeria	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine
1974	2.5	4	1.5	0	0	3	1	0.5	6.5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	2.5	7.5	2.5	0	0	4	1	1.5	7.5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	6	7.5	9	0	0	4	1	1.5	10.5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	10	7.5	9	0	0	4	1	1.5	10.5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	10	7.5	9	0	0	5.5	2	3	10.5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	10	7.5	9.5	0	0	9	2	3	10.5	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	10	7.5	9.5	0.5	0	9	0	6	10.5	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1.5	0	0	0	0	3	4	0
1981	10	7.5	9.5	0.5	0	9	0.5	6	10.5	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	0
1982	10	9.5	9.5	0.5	0	9	9	6	10.5	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	0
1983	10	9.5	9.5	6.5	1	9	9	6	10.5	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	0
1984	10	9.5	9.5	13	1	9	9	6	10.5	1	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	2.5	1.5	0	0	7.5	0	5	4	0
1985	11	9.5	9.5	13	1	9	9	6	10.5	1	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	7.5	0	5	4	0
1986	11	9.5	9.5	13	3	9	9	6	10.5	1	11	0	4	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	7.5	0	5	7.5	0
1987	11	9.5	9.5	13	4	9	9	6	10.5	1	11	2.5	4	0	1	0	1	3.5	3.5	0	1	7.5	0	5	7.5	0
1988	11	9.5	9.5	13	6	13	9	6	11.5	3	11	3.5	5	0	1	0	1.5	5	6	0	1.5	7.5	0	5	7.5	0
1989	11	11	11	13	6	13	9	6	11.5	7	11	6	6.5	4	1	5	12	10.5	10	0	12	7.5	9.5	5	7.5	0
1990	11	11	11	13	10	13	9	5	14.5	7	11	9.5	7.5	7.5	7	10	12	12	10.5	11	12	4	9.5	5	7.5	0
1991	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	5	14.5	7	11	12	7.5	9.5	10.5	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	8	5	7.5	0
1992	11	11	11	13	11.5	13	9	1	14.5	7	11	13	7.5	9.5	10.5	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	5	3	7.5	0
1993	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3	14.5	7	11	13	12	9.5	10.5	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	5	3	7.5	1.5
1994	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3	14.5	7	13	13	10	9.5	9	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	4	4	7.5	6.5
1995	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3	13	7	11	11.5	11	9.5	7	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	4	4	7.5	2.5
1996	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3	13	7	11	11.5	11	9.5	4	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	5	4	7.5	4
1997	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3	14.5	7	11	11.5	11	11	5	12	12	12	10.5	12	12	4	5	4	7.5	4
1998	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3.5	14.5	10	11	11.5	11	11	5	12	12	12	12	12	12	4	5	4	7.5	5
1999	11	11	11	13	13	13	9	3.5	16	10	11	11.5	11	11	5	12	12	12	12	12	12	4	6.5	4	7.5	4
74-99	256	244	247	216	147.5	257.5	170.5	104	306.5	90	242	130	119	101.5	76.5	123	134.5	151.5	135.5	119	134.5	85	66.5	86	129	27.5
ØRe				179					213			107				<b>133</b>						<b>78.8</b>				
max	11			13					16			13				<b>12</b>						<b>13</b>				
%t-c	<b>89.5</b>	<b>85.3</b>	<b>86.4</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>66.8</b>	<b>76.2</b>	<b>50.5</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>73.7</b>	<b>35.2</b>	<b>58.2</b>	<b>76.9</b>	<b>65.4</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>45.2</b>	<b>93.2</b>	<b>86.3</b>	<b>63.2</b>	<b>56.5</b>	<b>99.2</b>	<b>86.3</b>	<b>40.8</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>33.1</b>	<b>49.6</b>	<b>30.2</b>
%reg	<b>87.1</b>			<b>61.5</b>					<b>55.7</b>			<b>64.6</b>				<b>80.75</b>						<b>40.1</b>				

\*Maximum weighted score that can be achieved per country and year in the respective region

## Appendix 2: Weighted Compound MoT scores (1974-99)

	SE			SA					CA			FRS				CEE						ME NA				
	Spain	Greece	Portugal	Argentina	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia	Peru	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	Ukraine	Russia	Georgia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Turkey	Algeria	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine
1974	0	5	0	0	0	1	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	10.5	3	0	0	1	1	0.5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	4	10.5	9	0	1	1	1	0.5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	9	12	9	0.5	1	1	1	0.5	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	16	12	9	0	1	1	1	3.5	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	16	12	9	0.5	0	1	1	5	4	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	16	12	9	2	0	1	1	12	4	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	6.5	0
1981	16	12	9	2	0	1	1	12	4	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	6.5	0
1982	16	12	12	3	0	3	0.5	12	4	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	6.5	0
1983	16	12	12	13	5	3	0.5	12	4	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	4.5	6.5	0
1984	16	12	12	20	0	3	0.5	12	4	0	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	8.5	0	4.5	6.5	0
1985	16	12	12	20	1	3	7.5	12	4	11	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	8.5	0	4.5	6.5	0
1986	16	12	12	20	2	5	7.5	12	4	11	21	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	8.5	0	4.5	9.5	0
1987	16	12	12	20	1	5	7.5	14	4	11	21	0	3	0	0	0	0.5	1.5	0.5	0	0.5	8.5	0	4.5	9.5	0
1988	16	12	12	20	1	15	7.5	14	5	11	21	0	3	0	0	0.5	0.5	2	1.5	0	0.5	8.5	0	4.5	9.5	0
1989	16	12	12	20	18	22	7.5	14	5	13	23	1.5	3	1	0	2	5	10	14	0.5	5	8.5	6	4.5	9.5	0
1990	16	12	12	20	18	22	7.5	14	5	13	23	3.5	3	11	2.5	16	19	23	17	10.5	19	8.5	6	4.5	9.5	0
1991	16	12	12	20	18	22	7.5	14	5	13	23	12.5	4	11	2.5	21	19	23	17	13	19	8.5	6	4.5	9.5	0
1992	16	12	12	20	18	22	7.5	11	5	13	23	13.5	4	13	2.5	21	23	23	17	17	23	8.5	0	4.5	10.5	0
1993	16	12	12	20	18	22	7.5	17.5	5	11	23	13.5	15.5	13	2.5	21	23	23	17	17	23	8.5	0	4.5	10.5	0
1994	16	12	12	20	18	22	10.5	17.5	5	13	23	13.5	15.5	13	13.5	21	23	23	17	17	23	8.5	0	4.5	10.5	1.5
1995	16	12	12	20	18	22	10	17.5	5	13	23	13.5	15.5	16	6	21	23	23	17	17	23	8.5	0	4.5	10.5	0
1996	16	12	12	20	18	22	10	17.5	5	23	23	15	14	16	4	21	23	23	17	17	23	8.5	3.5	4.5	13.5	6.5
1997	16	12	12	20	18	22	10	17.5	16	23	23	15	14	16	4	21	23	23	19	17	23	8.5	4.5	4.5	13.5	2
1998	16	12	12	20	18	22	10	17.5	16	23	23	15	14	16	4	21	23	23	19	17	23	8.5	3.5	4.5	15.5	2
1999	16	12	12	20	18	22	10	17.5	16	23	23	15	14	16	4	21	23	23	19	17	23	8.5	3.5	4.5	15.5	2
7499	365	302	273	341	211	287	137.5	298.5	149	225	445	131.5	125.5	142	45.5	207.5	228	250.5	192	160	228	141	33	85.5	196	14
Øre	313.5			255					273			222.5				211						93.9				
Max*	16			22					23			16				23						23				
%t-c	<b>95.1</b>	<b>72.6</b>	<b>68.3</b>	<b>67.4</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>50.2</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>52.2</b>	<b>24.9</b>	<b>65.2</b>	<b>84.1</b>	<b>74.7</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>80.6</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>75.2</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>54.5</b>	<b>64.2</b>	<b>63.3</b>	<b>76.3</b>	<b>38.3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>21.9</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>10.1</b>
%reg	<b>78.6</b>			<b>46.8</b>					<b>58.1</b>			<b>59.3</b>				<b>68.3</b>						<b>25.2</b>				

\*Maximum weighted score that can be achieved per country and year in the respective region

## Appendix 3: Weighted Compound CoD scores (1974-99)

	SE			SA					CA			FSR				CEE						ME NA				
	Spain	Greece	Portugal	Argentina	Chile	Brazil	Bolivia	Peru	Mexico	Guatemala	Honduras	Ukraine	Russia	Georgia	Belarus	Bulgaria	Czech	Hungary	Poland	Romania	Slovakia	Turkey	Algeria	Egypt	Morocco	Palestine
1974	0	4.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1975	0	10.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	12	10	0	0	0	0	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	9.5	12.5	10	0	0	0	0	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	12	13	10	0	0	0	0	0	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	17.5	13	10	0	0	0	0	2	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	17.5	13	11	0	0	0	0	6.5	7.5	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	2	0
1981	16	14.5	11	0	0	0	0	6.5	7.5	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	2	0
1982	16	16	13.5	0	0	0	3.5	6.5	7.5	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	2	0
1983	17.5	16	12	5	0	0	3.5	6.5	7.5	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	1.5	2	0
1984	17.5	16	10.5	17.5	0	3	3.5	6.5	7.5	2	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.5	0	1.5	3	0
1985	19	19	13.5	18	0	3	9.5	9.5	7.5	5	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.5	0	1.5	3	0
1986	22	20	13.5	16.5	0	3	9.5	9.5	7.5	5	23	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.5	0	1.5	3	0
1987	22	23	13.5	15	0	3	9.5	9.5	7.5	5	23	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.5	0	1.5	3	0
1988	22	22	13.5	15	0	8	9.5	9.5	7.5	5	23	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8.5	0	1.5	3	0
1989	22	26	15.5	17.5	6	17	9.5	9.5	7.5	5	27	0.5	1.5	0	0	0	1.5	4.5	0	0	0	8.5	5	1.5	3	0
1990	22	26	21.5	18.5	10	20	9.5	11	7.5	8	27	0.5	1.5	0	0	7.5	11.5	9.5	8	3.5	12.5	8.5	5	1.5	3.5	0
1991	22	26	21.5	20	12	20	9.5	11	7.5	8	27	6.5	1.5	3	0.5	14.5	12.5	9.5	13.5	8	12.5	11.5	5	1.5	3.5	0
1992	22	26	23	20	12	20	9.5	13	7.5	8	27	9.5	2.5	4.5	0.5	13	14.5	9.5	16	11	13	11.5	4	1.5	3.5	0
1993	22	23	23	19	16	20.5	14.5	13.5	7.5	9	27	9.5	7	4.5	0.5	11	14.5	9.5	18.5	11	13	11.5	4	1.5	3.5	0
1994	23	23	23	22.5	16	26	14.5	13.5	11.5	10	27	11.5	7	4.5	3	16.5	16	17.5	19.5	11	14	11.5	5.5	1.5	3.5	4
1995	23	24	23	22.5	16	26	14.5	14.5	11.5	10	27	12.5	9	4.5	0	21	16	17.5	19	11	14	14.5	4	1.5	3.5	1
1996	25.5	27	27	19.5	16	26	14.5	14.5	12.5	22	27	14.5	8.5	4.5	1	21	18	20.5	19.5	22	15.5	14.5	5	1.5	3.5	7
1997	25.5	26	27	21	16	26	18.5	14.5	15.5	22	27	14.5	8.5	5.5	1	15	18	20.5	21	22	15.5	14.5	6.5	1.5	3.5	4
1998	25.5	26	27	21	16	26	18.5	14.5	15.5	22	27	16.5	8.5	5.5	1	22.5	22.5	24.5	24	22	23	14.5	6.5	1.5	8.5	4
1999	23	26	27	22.5	16	26	18.5	14.5	15.5	22	27	14	12.5	3	1	22.5	21.5	24.5	24	22	23	14.5	6.5	1.5	8.5	4
74-99	464	504	410.5	311	152	273.5	200	216.5	232	168	478	110	71	39.5	8.5	164.5	165	164.5	187.5	143.5	156	184	57	30	71	24
Øreg	459.5			230.5					292.5			57.5				163.5						73.2				
Max*	27			30					29			28				28						29				
%t-c	<b>74.7</b>	<b>71.78</b>	<b>63.33</b>	<b>60.97</b>	<b>46.1</b>	<b>56.97</b>	<b>37.03</b>	<b>34.37</b>	<b>30.76</b>	<b>36.21</b>	<b>82.41</b>	<b>35.71</b>	<b>18.12</b>	<b>15.68</b>	<b>3.36</b>	<b>58.75</b>	<b>58.93</b>	<b>53.39</b>	<b>60.89</b>	<b>51.25</b>	<b>55.71</b>	<b>39.66</b>	<b>17.86</b>	<b>5.17</b>	<b>12.24</b>	<b>13.79</b>
%reg	<b>69.94</b>			<b>47.1</b>					<b>49.79</b>			<b>18.21</b>				<b>56.5</b>						<b>17.76</b>				

\*Maximum weighted score that can be achieved per country and year in the respective region

**Appendix 4: Country ranking on simple and weighted LoA an CoD scales, based on time-corrected scores**

	<b>%LoA+CoD</b>		<b>%LoA+CoD(w)</b>
Spain	170.8	Spain	164.2
Greece	168.6	Greece	157.1
Romania	164.0	Bulgaria	152.0
Bulgaria	162.8	Romania	150.5
Portugal	162.8	Portugal	149.7
Czech	158.7	Czech	145.2
Slovakia	155.7	Argentina	144.1
Argentina	154.8	Slovakia	142.0
Honduras	146.4	Honduras	140.6
Brazil	143.7	Brazil	133.2
Hungary	131.6	Slovenia	122.4
Slovenia	131.3	Poland	117.4
Poland	129.7	Hungary	116.6
Ukraine	127.8	Chile	112.9
Chile	126.5	Ukraine	112.6
Mexico	124.8	Mexico	104.5
Bolivia	108.5	Bolivia	87.5
Georgia	100.3	Georgia	86.7
Turkey	90.4	Russia	83.5
Russia	90.0	Turkey	80.5
Guatemala	87.6	Guatemala	71.4
Peru	82.9	Peru	65.2
Algeria	77.0	Algeria	64.5
Morocco	73.3	Morocco	61.8
Belarus	54.1	Belarus	48.6
Palestine	49.7	Palestine	44.0
Egypt	49.2	Egypt	38.3
Tunisia	27.0	Tunisia	18.2