Biography

I completed my Ph.D. at the Institute for International Economic Studies at Stockholm University in October 2010. My research interests are in applied game theory and political economics. To date, my research has focused on theoretical models of elections. In the future, I would also like to apply my skills also to other fields of applied economic theory. Moreover, I am considering testing some of my models experimentally.
I obtained a M.Sc. in Economics from Tilburg University (2003) and the German degree of Diplomvolkswirt from Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (2002). The title of my Ph.D. dissertation is ‘Models of Electoral Competition - Three Essays in Political Economics’ and my principal advisor was Torsten Persson.
I have finished three working papers that you can find on my personal homepage:
"The Swing Voters’ Blessing” shows that less informed voters do not necessarily lead to less desirable policy outcomes. On the contrary, under certain conditions less informed voters force politicians to implement more centrist policies.
“Lobbying and Elections” shows the effects of lobbying on policy in a model with voters who have rational expectations of interest group influence on policy. In equilibrium, lobbying can be welfare enhancing.
“Lexicographic Voting” shows that prospective and retrospective voting motives can be reconciled within the standard rational choice framework. The median voter’s preferred policy is implemented while the ruling party can be held accountable for rent-seeking behavior.