(How) Can we convince politicians to reduce clientelism and corruption?

Organised by

• Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Most of the world's less developed countries are plagued by clientelism and corruption. Previous attempts to improve governance have focused on voters, trying to understand why they continue to vote for bad politicians and to convince them to shift their electoral support to others. But in many cases, there are no others who would do a better job. Miriam Golden presents new data that shows that in these settings, the average elected official serves only a single term. Thus, voters do "throw the bad guys out" but it makes no difference. To improve governance in poor democracies, perhaps we need to professionalise the political class and help politicians learn to overcome clientelism and corruption. Although that would reduce their immediate rents from office, it would gradually allow politicians to build long term political careers in which they learn to serve voters and the public interest. 

The lecture is in person only. A recording will be made available online afterwards.

The event will be followed by drinks.