Gender Policy and Signaling

Organised by

• Department of Economics

Abstract:

Consider an economy in which men and women have the same productivity if home duties are equally divided between spouses, but taking up more duties reduces productivity. Preferences for the division of duties are more heterogeneous within than between genders. Spouses are similar within couples but traditional couples prefer that women take more home duties. If employers cannot observe couples’ types, a pooling equilibrium emerges in which the presence of traditional couples induces firms to pay women less because of statistical discrimination. In this equilibrium, efficient gender policies should aim at allowing each couple to credibly signal its type. Gender Based Taxation may offer such a credible set of signals.

'Gender Talks at Villa La Fonte' is a monthly forum dedicated to presenting and discussing gender-related topics. The events include presentations from both internal and occasional external speakers, followed by discussions on the presented topics. The goal is to encourage a dynamic exchange of ideas and perspectives in the field of gender economics. The 'Women in VLF' initiative invites everyone to participate in these inclusive debates, providing an academic perspective on issues that impact our everyday experiences.