Responding to non-cooperative international behaviour

Organised by

• Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
• GGP: Global Governance Programme

When other states act non-cooperatively, governments must choose between yielding or taking a tough stance, often incurring material costs. Despite these costs, governments are incentivised to sanction non-cooperative behaviour for reputational reasons, although garnering voter support for this approach can be challenging. This paper explores how different framings of the trade-off between material benefits and reputational concerns influence voter support for a tough, costly response. Through survey experiments across a variety of countries, it examines voter reactions to various frames in three scenarios: cherry-picking (Swiss and UK EU market access), violations of international law (Russia's invasion of Ukraine), and coercive bargaining (Turkey's NATO veto, EU's funding threats to Hungary). Results show that emphasising reputational risks reduces voter willingness to compromise, while highlighting material consequences increases it. Ultimately, voters prioritise national reputation, indicating an understanding of strategic foreign policy considerations.