What is affective polarisation, and what causes it?
Affective polarisation refers to the mutual dislike between different societal groups. This phenomenon is predominantly studied in a political context: For example, in the United States, many individuals express positive feelings towards the Democratic Party while disliking the Republican Party, and vice versa. In the UK, a similar divide exists between Brexiteers and Remainers, and there are many other examples worldwide. Essentially, affective polarisation is about people’s feelings, and an affectively polarised society is divided into mutually hostile political groups.
The causes of affective polarisation are debated, but two central approaches have emerged. The first emphasises the role of identities: individuals who strongly identify with their political party may develop a “tribal” instinct and – as Lilliana Mason puts it – behave like sports fans rooting for their “home team”, leading to hostility towards the opposing “team”. This dynamic is strengthened when social and political identities align; for example, ethnic and sexual minorities in the US predominantly favour Democrats, while white evangelicals support Republicans. The second theory perceives policy disagreements as the central driver of affective polarisation: people dislike opposing parties because they perceive their positions on critical issues (e.g. abortion rights) as wrong or harmful. This approach underlines the rational roots of affective polarisation. Empirical evidence supports both theories to some extent, and in reality, affective polarisation is likely triggered by a combination of rational and tribal elements.
Media and political elites play a significant role in either exacerbating or mitigating both mechanisms of affective polarisation. While they could promote consensus, they often choose to intensify conflict for financial or political gain, further deepening societal divisions.
Could you give us examples of the intrusion of party cues in everyday life? In an earlier conversation, you linked stereotyping with affective polarisation. Could you provide more insight into your research on this issue and share some of your key findings?
There is, indeed, clear evidence that individuals perceive their fellow citizens through a prejudiced lens based on political preferences. For instance, voters systematically assume that supporters of opposing parties are more selfish and less intelligent.
A well-known set of indicators of affective polarisation's intrusion into daily life is social distance — the extent to which people accept supporters of disliked parties within their social circles. In the US, nearly half of Democrats and Republicans express dissatisfaction if their child were to marry a supporter of the opposing party. Recent research by myself and several other scholars indicates that similar tendencies also exist in European countries, and in some cases, people may even want to avoid being coworkers or neighbours with someone who supports a disliked party.
These findings stem from public opinion surveys, raising the question of whether such attitudes also translate into actual behaviour. Evidence suggests they do: for example, discrimination based on political affiliation can occur in the job market. A good (or actually sad) example of how affective polarisation leads to real-life consequences is a story of a pro-Trump tow truck driver who left a disabled woman stranded on the highway simply because he noticed a Bernie Sanders sticker on her bumper.
In summary, an affectively polarised political environment can lead to a society where members of antagonistic political camps are unwilling to date, befriend, engage in civic or economic cooperation, or even live near one another.
How harmful can affective polarisation be for democracy? Can we find a “treatment” in a scalable and stable way?
Evidence shows that higher levels of affective polarisation are associated with democratic backsliding globally. Why? If people loathe the opposing party or parties, they view them not merely as rivals, but as enemies. This mindset can lead voters to accept democratic norm violations by their own party if it helps them defeat their adversaries.
However, some studies argue that the dangers posed by affective polarisation may be overstated. Others suggest that it can even increase electoral turnout. A recent study found that both very low and very high levels of affective polarisation are linked to diminished support for democratic norms, while moderately polarised feelings can enhance democratic attitudes. Thus, there might be a “sweet spot” where citizens are polarised enough to care about election outcomes, but not so polarised that they perceive opponents as enemies that need to be destroyed.
Addressing excessive affective polarisation is possible through interventions like priming common identities, encouraging cross-partisan dialogue, and correcting misconceptions about out-groups. However, the challenge lies in implementing these strategies on a larger scale. I believe the education system is key. Incorporating the topic of polarisation into civic education classes can help individuals learn to appreciate different views and disagree respectfully with one another.
Voting advice applications could serve as valuable tools in this educational framework. Our preliminary research using data from the EU&I project for the 2024 European elections suggests that informing individuals about the actual positions of various parties can reduce dislike towards political opponents.
In your recent paper, 'Patterns of Affective Polarization Toward Parties and Leaders Across the Democratic World,' which won the Best CSES Scholarship award, you explore how affective polarisation manifests in different political contexts. Could you elaborate on how the findings from that study might help us better understand the current political and public debate, particularly in light to the upcoming US elections? What similarities and differences do you observe between affective polarisation in the US and Europe, based on your research?
This paper provides a broad cross-national comparison and helps us better understand the structural and institutional foundations of affective polarisation across 40 countries. Comparing the US with Europe, a key difference is that Americans exhibit more polarised feelings towards leading candidates than towards their parties, whereas, in Europe, parties as organisations are more polarising than their leaders. This is largely due to the US’s presidential two-party system, which largely reduces the electoral competition to just two main candidates.
Although affective polarisation in the US began before Donald Trump entered the political arena in 2015, he has intensified the existing hostility. Data also confirms his polarising appeal: after the 2020 election, for instance, Democrats disliked Trump more than the Republican Party itself, while Republicans viewed Biden slightly less negatively than the Democratic Party.
Looking ahead to the 2024 presidential election, much depends on Trump. Will he win or lose, and how will he and his followers behave if he loses? If he does lose and exit the political arena, it may allow for a less controversial Republican leader to emerge, potentially reducing affective polarisation. However, the current race is very close and there are many reasons to be concerned about the upcoming US election. Given the high levels of affective polarisation, accepting the loss will be very difficult for either side.
Andres Reiljan is a Max Weber Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre and the co-leader of the EU&I project. His main fields of expertise are comparative politics and political behaviour. Both his PhD and postdoctoral project focused on the concept of affective polarisation, broadly defined as the mutual antipathy between different political camps in society. His recent paper, 'Patterns of Affective Polarisation Toward Parties and Leaders Across the Democratic World', won the Best CSES Scholarship award.