Ludwig Schulze reflects on these electoral results - that showcased a rise of anti-establishment parties - in the framework of his broader research on why some individuals became less supportive of liberal democracy and, therefore, approached extremist parties.
Could you please tell us about yourself and your research topic?
I have just started the third year of my PhD at the EUI Department of Political and Social Sciences under the supervision of professor Elias Dinas.
My research seeks to tackle the question of why some people in young democracies do not commit to the idea of liberal democracy. Specifically, I focus on former communist countries. Despite the repressive policies people experienced under communism, it is puzzling to find that a substantial share of people continues to support some form of a more authoritarian political system. While some might point to a 'communist legacy' as an explanation, the issue becomes more intricate once we acknowledge how challenging it is to isolate the experience under communism itself from other pre-existing historical differences or from the period immediately following the collapse of communist regimes. So, what is it about communism that changed the hearts and minds of some people in a way that decreased their support for liberal democracy? My research aims to explain this question.
The first results of my research show that continued authoritarian political support depends on the economic privileges citizens derived from communist regimes. These benefits were not allocated randomly. I use as a case study the Soviet military bases across the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), showing how these bases became a source of economic privilege for the hosting communities during the period of the GDR's command economy, when the government dictated the levels of production and the prices that could be charged for goods and services. However, once these privileges were lost as the Soviets withdrew after German reunification, these very communities reacted by supporting the communist successor party of the GDR in subsequent federal elections. Further survey evidence reveals that individuals in these areas are also much less supportive of liberal democracy and, astonishingly, are more likely to participate in pro-Russian protests today. This lack of democratic commitment recently came to the surface during two regional elections in East Germany.
The results of the elections in Thuringia and Saxony saw a success of the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD). Did you expect this result? What are the reasons behind it?
While growing up in East Germany, it was hard not to notice the rise of the AfD, Germany’s far-right party. Although one should have become accustomed to seeing far-right protests and strong electoral performances by far-right parties, it still frightens me whenever I realise how many people have voted for the AfD in my hometown.
The outcomes of the last two regional elections in East Germany were not surprising. It was generally acknowledged that the AfD would attract a large share of the electorate. The reasons for this are numerous: the normalisation of the radical right across East Germany (e.g., it has generally become more acceptable to express support for the radical right despite Germany’s fascist past), discontent with the German government and its policies (such as COVID-19 restrictions, sanctions on Russia, immigration, and environmental policies, to name a few), and low levels of partisanship.
While the AfD won the state election in Thuringia, they became second in the state of Saxony with only a good percent behind the first placed Christian Democrats (CDU). However, none of the state governments were re-elected and therefore many question marks remain regarding the potential governing coalition. The three remaining established democratic parties – the CDU, the Greens, and the Social Democrats (SPD) – cannot form a majority government, with the Greens not even surpassing the 5% threshold in Thuringia. The Liberal Party (FDP), receiving barely more than 1% of the votes, has hit political rock bottom.
What are the perspectives now for the government of these regional states?
As the future remains uncertain, some might argue in favour of including the AfD in the two state governments. The motivation behind this could be to show voters that even the AfD cannot fulfil its promises and does not offer substantial solutions to citizens’ concerns. Or, some Christian Democrats might favour such a coalition due to shared policy areas with the AfD that differ from left-wing parties. Both AfD and CDU deem not only issues such as immigration and domestic security as some of the top priorities, but they also partially overlap with their support for more restrictive measures. Such measures, however, would find only little support within more left-wing parties like the Greens or the SPD.
As of today, a relatively strong norm against cooperating with the AfD persists, and history has shown that these ‘experiments’ of cooperation with far-right parties rarely end well. Thus, one can only hope that political actors find an alternative approach. This implies that traditional democratic parties must open themselves to another challenger party: the BSW (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht). Although the BSW was founded only a few months ago, it has already exceeded 10% of the vote in both Thuringia and Saxony. While many of its leaders come from the traditional far-left party Die Linke, it is still too early to determine what the BSW truly represents. It could be described as a new party exploring uncharted territory in the German political landscape – economically left-wing but culturally right-wing. It is certainly not the type of party the CDU would like to cooperate with, but it might be the only way to circumvent the AfD. In fact, in the case of Thuringia, excluding the AfD as the winner of the election would require votes from all other parties to form a majority, including Die Linke.
It is too early to tell how everything will play out in the end. But given the high level of uncertainty and distrust among some of the parties, many options are on the table. Either way, we are likely to experience new political majorities unseen in Germany ever before.
What does the rise of AfD - and in general of extremist parties - imply for Chancellor Scholz’s coalition government?
The current government under Chancellor Scholz was already under heavy pressure even before a single vote was counted in the two regional elections. The election results did not improve the situation, but I find it hard to imagine that any political leader was surprised. In fact, the governing parties have suffered electoral losses in most regional elections since taking office. Nonetheless, some political leaders might have even begun to realise that East Germany has developed a different political landscape compared to West Germany, where established parties generally face more difficulties.
While some discussions have taken place between the SPD and CDU at the federal level, I do not expect any substantial shifts in the composition of the government. The next official national election is in one year, and most polling results for the governing parties are too poor to anticipate their agreeing to an early election. However, we might see some internal shifts within the parties. For example, the FDP has been voted out of most regional parliaments since taking office. While FDP party leaders might view themselves as a nationwide rather than a regional party, it will be interesting to see how they manage the discontent within the party, as many regional politicians have lost their jobs in recent years.
Ludwig Schulze is a researcher at the EUI Department of Political and Social Sciences. Ludwig’s PhD is on the origins of authoritarian attitudes with a special focus on former communist countries.