Marco Almada is an alumnus of the EUI Law Department coming from Brazil. He boasts a robust academic background: he completed his bachelor's degree in Computer Science at the University of Campinas, where he also earned a research master’s in Computer Engineering. After a few years working as a data scientist, he decided to pursue a Bachelor of Laws at the University of São Paulo. Thanks to this background, he soon became interested in how the technical aspects of technology are handled by the law.
Marco's doctoral research at the EUI, Delegating the Law of Artificial Intelligence: A Procedural Account of Technology-Neutral Regulation, delved into the complexities of technology-neutral regulation. The core idea behind this approach is that the application of the law should not depend on the specific technical choices made in creating a regulated technology. "A technology-neutral approach to the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) might establish that AI technologies can only be used if they meet certain conditions (such as being accurate and avoiding discrimination) that apply equally to all kinds of algorithms," he explains. In his thesis, he argues that technology neutrality is widely seen as desirable for regulation, especially in the European Union, but its value is often taken for granted. He suggests that we should look more closely at this concept and what it means for our attempts to regulate AI and other technologies.
The main argument Marco makes is that technology neutrality can take various forms in regulation, but all of these forms involve some kind of delegation of powers. Policymakers can only avoid making decisions about how the law applies to certain technologies if somebody else makes those decisions on their behalf. Indeed, technology law scholarship has already identified various actors who end up making those decisions: judges deciding on cases that hinge on a specific technology, regulatory bodies creating rules that are specific to certain technologies, or, in some cases, even the regulated actors themselves. What is new about the procedural account of technology neutrality Marco proposes in his thesis is the idea that this delegation of powers is not a consequence of neutrality, but the most important thing about it. So, if we want to understand the concrete implications of technology neutrality, we must analyse the delegation it creates: what powers are delegated? To whom? Under which conditions?
Marco believes looking at technology neutrality as a form of delegation can be useful in several ways. From a conceptual point of view, this procedural account finds common ground between the different meanings given to the concept in academic and policy discourse. Academics and policymakers have defended technology neutrality for various reasons: some view it as a tool to foster technological development, others argue it is a way to prevent the law from becoming outdated as technology evolves, among other explanations. Those goals can be pursued in various ways, such as formulating the law in abstract terms that can fit any technology, or empowering other actors (such as standardisation bodies) to create technology-specific norms, as the AI Act does. Marco believes that if we emphasise what is common between all those approaches — the delegation of the power to specify the technical contents of the law — we can see that many disputes about whether a given regulation is technology-neutral are, in fact, disputes about the goals that regulation ought to achieve.
From a more practical perspective, Marco sustains that viewing technology neutrality as a form of delegation can help analyse regulation in three ways. First, it can help us find situations in which the delegation of powers might fail in achieving the policymaker's goals, for example, because it transfers powers to an actor who lacks the technical expertise to apply the law in practice. Second, a focus on delegation suggests that technology neutrality is sometimes undesirable, even if it can be effective. This is the case, for instance, if a technology-neutral approach leaves important decisions about the functioning of our democratic institutions in the hands of private actors such as standardisation bodies. Finally, the procedural account also suggests that one should pay attention to the conditions under which the delegated powers are exercised. As he shows in his thesis, these three issues all appear, in one form or another, in the provisions of the AI Act and other EU law instruments dealing with AI.
Based on his findings, Marco proposes three key recommendations. First, he suggests that technology neutrality should be viewed as a tool rather than a guiding principle. Second, those who design (or analyse) technology regulation should pay attention to how technology neutrality affects the exercise of regulatory powers, as different contexts may require different approaches. Finally, he encourages technology scholars to engage with the literature on the delegation of powers in public law to better understand the dynamics at play.
Marco's choice of this research topic was inspired by his dual background in computer science and law. He explains: "Throughout my PhD, I studied several contexts in which lawmakers, courts, and other legal actors tried to make sense of the uncertainties surrounding the technical side of AI and apply existing law. When looking at how law manages those uncertainties, the idea of technology neutrality appears everywhere, often as a desirable feature of regulation." His interactions with his supervisor, Professor Curtin, and her group of scholars at the EUI were instrumental in shaping his thesis. Marco credits the collaborative environment at the EUI for helping him connect ideas from administrative law scholarship to technology law.
Looking ahead, Marco plans to continue his academic exploration of technology regulation. He aims to study how lawmakers in the EU and beyond address the uncertainties surrounding AI and other technologies. While his future remains open, his commitment to advancing our understanding of technology law is unwavering.